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AGGREGATION  AND  CONSTITUTIONAL  RIGHTS
Brandon L. Garrett*
Constitutional rights can impact large groups, yet most plaintiffs in
civil rights cases bring individual claims.  Critics of the Supreme Court’s
decisions regarding class actions, such as Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes,1 have argued that the Court adopts unduly restrictive interpreta-
tions of class action procedures.  I trace the problem deeper into the substance
of constitutional doctrine.  The Court has defined certain constitutional
rights to require highly individualized inquiries.  For example, Fourth
Amendment excessive force claims, the bread and butter of constitutional tort
litigation, often require an individual analysis of the reasonableness of the
search.  As a result, courts may deny class certification citing to a lack of
common issues.  Other constitutional rights—ranging from due process
rights, criminal procedure rights, equal protection claims, and takings
claims—similarly resist aggregate treatment.  The Wal-Mart ruling—
although procedural—will have a disproportionate impact on particular
substantive areas of the law, even within civil rights litigation.  I suggest
that this confluence of procedural rulings and change in constitutional doc-
trine was not anticipated nor is it entirely desirable.  I explore changes to sub-
constitutional remedial doctrine and statutes that could rekindle aggregate
constitutional litigation, as well as associational standing rulings that facil-
itate group litigation.  If constitutional litigation becomes a purely solitary
affair, sporadic cases may have an outsized impact, but in an ad hoc way
that provides poor notice to government officials.  Aggregation can improve
clarity, legitimacy, participation, and representation.  Bigger lawsuits may
sometimes be better—particularly when developing constitutional values.
 2012 Brandon L. Garrett.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Roy L. and Rosamund Woodruff Morgan Professor of Law, University of
Virginia School of Law.  I thank for their invaluable comments, Kerry Abrams, Samuel
Issacharoff, Jennifer Laurin, Alexander Reinert, George Rutherglen, and Larry
Walker, and participants in a panel at the 2012 SEALS conference.
1 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional rights and remedies are not just individual rights.
Interpretation of constitutional provisions alters the structure and
obligations of government and rights and responsibilities of citizens.
Constitutional law affects groups, groups pursue impact litigation to
press forward new constitutional theories, and courts supervise injunc-
tions requiring government bodies to comply with constitutional
norms.  Despite the group-based nature of some civil rights litigation
and the impact of constitutional litigation on groups, individual plain-
tiffs chiefly bring civil rights litigation in constitutional tort suits.  Why
is that?
One reason is that class actions seeking group-based civil rights
remedies may be difficult to bring.  This is no surprise to observers of
the Supreme Court’s recent class action decisions, particularly the
high profile ruling in Wal-Mart v. Dukes,2 decertifying a massive
nationwide class action seeking remedies under Title VII, a civil rights
statute, and calling for “rigorous” merits assessment of commonality
prior to class certification.3  The Court called the Wal-Mart class
action, in which plaintiffs sought individualized relief, inconsistent
with the historical purpose of the applicable class action provision,
which grew out of “a series of decisions involving challenges to racial
segregation—conduct that was remedied by a single classwide order.”4
The history of the evolution of civil rights class actions has been unex-
pected and little examined.5  Groundbreaking 1968 revisions to the
class action rule, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, sought to facili-
tate civil rights class actions seeking injunctions.  The Court has
repeatedly noted Rule 23(b)(2) was designed for “[c]ivil rights cases
against parties charged with unlawful, class-based discrimination.”6
All of the Justices agreed with the portion of the Wal-Mart deci-
sion narrowing 23(b)(2) practice to such civil rights actions seeking
injunctions.7  The Court’s still broader ruling (contested by the dis-
senters) required a searching merits examination of the threshold
2 Id.
3 Id. at 2551.
4 Id. at 2558.
5 For a piece exploring the origins of Rule 23(b)(2) in concerns arising from the
civil rights movement, see David Marcus, Flawed But Noble: Desegregation Litigation and
Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 702–08 (2011).
6 Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997).
7 Thus, the Wal-Mart dissenters agreed that 23(b)(2) was not appropriate (“I
agree with the Court [that this class action] should not have been certified under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).”) but argued that it could be certified
under 23(b)(3). Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Rule 23(a) requirement of commonality (that there be common ques-
tions of fact and law shared by the putative class members).8  Observ-
ers predicted a negative impact not just in Title VII class actions, but
also civil rights class actions more broadly.9  However, the Wal-Mart
decision will affect some types of civil rights class actions far more
than others.  That is because for some time now, the Court has
defined a range of constitutional rights to require individualized
inquiries, which may then run afoul of the commonality requirement.
For example, Fourth Amendment use of force claims, the bread
and butter of constitutional tort litigation, require an individual
inquiry regarding the reasonableness of the use of force.10  As a result,
a court may deny class certification citing a lack of common issues in
the class.  For related reasons, individual victims may have a difficult
time pursuing injunctive relief to improve police policies.  Other con-
stitutional rights—ranging from due process rights, criminal proce-
dure rights, Equal Protection Clause claims, and Takings Clause
claims—similarly resist aggregate treatment as well as injunctive
relief.11  Why?  The Court has elaborated “totality of the circum-
stances” or “individualized suspicion” or “materiality” or other con-
text-specific tests.  The story is mixed; for other constitutional claims,
some involving the same Bill of Rights or Fourteenth Amendment
provisions, the Court has expanded or narrowed rights, but in ways
that do not hinder aggregation.  At the same time, the Court has
developed doctrines regarding standing and official immunity, as well
as remedial barriers, that each created individual issues frustrating
civil rights class actions.12
Over time, constitutional substance and not procedure may
explain the decline of civil rights class actions.  The number and pro-
portion of class actions brought in federal civil rights cases has appar-
8 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
9 See Erwin Chemerinsky, New Limits on Class Actions, TRIAL, Nov. 2011, at 54, 54
(“Wal-Mart does not end the ability of plaintiffs to bring employment discrimination
class actions. . . . Despite this, class actions will be more difficult to bring.”); David G.
Savage, Supreme Court Blocks Huge Class Action Suit Against Wal-Mart, L.A. TIMES, June
21, 2011 (quoting law professor John Coffee commenting that “it largely eliminates
the monetary threat facing big employers”); Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Limits
Wal-Mart Discrimination Case, NPR.ORG (June 20, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/
06/20/137296721/supreme-court-limits-wal-mart-discrimination-case (quoting civil
rights attorney David Sanford, stating “[t]his is a disaster not only for civil rights liti-
gants but for anyone who wants to bring a class action”).
10 See infra Part II.A.2.
11 See infra Part II.A.
12 See infra Part II.B.
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ently fallen over the years.13  There are many potential explanations,
but it is possible at least that the Court’s rulings have over time ren-
dered some constitutional rights unsuitable to class action resolution.
Regardless, no clear lines can be drawn because Congress has also at
times enacted new civil rights statutes that are not directly tied to Bill
of Rights provisions, but rather grounded in Commerce Clause
power.14  Those statutes are far more amenable to class treatment—
though not always intentionally so.  The Court has repeatedly stepped
in, as in Wal-Mart, to impose limits.  The Court has restricted access to
class actions asserting bare constitutional claims and claims under fed-
eral civil rights statutes.  In both respects, the civil rights class action
has not fulfilled its promise.  The result not only makes litigation out-
comes more unpredictable for plaintiffs and for government, but it
provides a poor forum for development of constitutional doctrine.
The role of aggregation in civil rights litigation may need to be recon-
sidered from the ground up.
In Part I, I describe how in the areas of mass torts, securities litiga-
tion, antitrust, and others, courts, scholars and legislators have over
time come to recognize that the class action device redefined aspects
of the civil system by affecting the content of substantive rights.15  By
permitting mass litigation, the rise of modern class actions practice
not only changed the way cases were handled procedurally, but it also
affected how courts interpreted common law and statutory substantive
rights.  This connection between class action procedure and substan-
tive rights also exists in regards to constitutional litigation, but the
relationship has not been developed.16  Nevertheless, scholars increas-
ingly appreciate the role that procedure and remedies play in the
development of constitutional rights.17  That literature has not taken
13 See infra Part II.
14 See infra Part II.C.
15 See infra Part I.A.  On the general connection between substantive law and
aggregation, see AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION
§ 2.03, cmt. a–b, at 105–07 (2010).
16 See Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification, and Distortion,
2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 475, 478; Samuel Issacharoff, The Vexing Problem of Reliance in
Consumer Class Actions, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1633, 1643 (2000) (facilitating aggregation in
consumer class actions “the substantive law has dispensed with requiring consumers
to directly prove reliance and instead imposed either strict liability, a rebuttable pre-
sumption of reliance, or a hybrid that presumes the seller will be held accountable for
its affirmative representations”).
17 See Brandon Garret & James Liebman, Experimentalist Equal Protection, 22 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 261, 324–27 (2004); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in
Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 113 (1999); Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the
Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2002); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism
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stock of the advent of the class action, modern nonparty preclusion
law, as well as other procedural developments that have reshaped con-
stitutional litigation.
Part II explores unintended procedural results of substantive con-
stitutional rulings, examining Eighth Amendment, Fourth Amend-
ment, Equal Protection Clause, Takings Clause, and criminal
procedure claims.18  The constitutional text rarely includes any lan-
guage that addresses issues of individualized or aggregate proof.
Instead, the Supreme Court to an unappreciated degree has in its rul-
ings scaled constitutional rights.  In other respects, the Court adopts
constitutional rules that define the harm as a group harm suited to
aggregate resolution.  Even different theories under the same consti-
tutional provision may be either amenable or totally incompatible
with aggregate treatment.  Remedies have also been individualized, in
ways that hinder aggregate litigation, with an exception: the Court’s
associational standing cases that highlight the advantages of group
litigation.
Part III develops a theory of the relationship between democratic
accountability and aggregation.  Our overly individualized constitu-
tional litigation system does not generally compensate individuals
well, although in some cases it can.  Many constitutional tort suits
founder on official immunity and other procedural defenses.  Nor
does our system deter system-wide constitutional violations well.  An
alternative to a class action is an individual suit seeking injunction,
which may challenge a statute or practice that also affects the public,
and may set an important precedent.  However, individual injunctions
are not clearly enforceable by non-parties, making class actions highly
preferable when challenging statutes, policies, and practices.  When
damages and not injunctions are sought, ad hoc individualized litiga-
tion may compensate individuals some of the time, but it can also have
perverse results.  It is a poor way to develop constitutional law (and
indeed, in part for that reason, the Court has increasingly encouraged
and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 857 (1999); Daniel J. Meltzer, Deter-
ring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Pri-
vate Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 249–52 (1988); Charles F. Sabel &
William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 1016, 1016 (2004).
18 I have previously developed how individualized criminal procedure rights,
accompanied by changes in habeas corpus procedure, have undesirably hindered sys-
temic claims regarding criminal procedure violations in federal (but not necessarily
state) courts. See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CALIF.
L. REV. 383 (2007).
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lower courts to rule on non-merits grounds.)19  The constitutional tort
lottery may result in windfalls to a few injured individuals but not most
others.  Judgments impose damages on a few officers, which insurance
will usually cover, while supervisors and policymakers are left off the
hook.
In contrast, class action litigation can focus on systemic issues,20
creating more efficient mechanisms to remedy harms, and perhaps
vindicating rights in a way that is more legitimate from a democratic
perspective.  All members of a group have rights in the litigation and
can benefit from the remedy.  While counsel and interest groups may
drive the litigation, conversely, idiosyncratic individual plaintiffs will
not.  Indeed, some constitutional rights may be particularly suited for
aggregate treatment precisely because they protect groups that are
otherwise disadvantaged in the political process.
I conclude by describing how several changes in sub-constitu-
tional and remedial doctrine could change the balance in favor of the
aggregate over the individual.  In aggregate cases, individualized limi-
tations on remedies need not bar aggregate relief to the class, includ-
ing injunctions, though they may limit liability for damages to
individual plaintiffs.  The Court has also expressed concern for ensur-
ing plaintiffs have proper standing to address matters of government
policy.  The fact that a case is a class action should affect the standing
analysis, just as it does when an association or organization brings a
case.  Prioritizing injunctive remedies—and rules that are not unduly
individualized—may better develop the interests at stake when devel-
oping constitutional rights.
A litigation system that prioritizes the aggregate may better
address systemic constitutional violations.  The Court may continue
down the path of individualizing rights, but doing so does not effec-
tively insulate Government.  Instead, it provides poor notice to offi-
cials, creates an ad hoc system for compensation, and provides an
unsuitable litigation forum for developing the meaning of the
Constitution.
19 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009) (abandoning the two-step Sau-
cier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), procedure in which merits of a constitutional claim
were considered before reaching issue of qualified immunity).
20 David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort
Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 847–53 (2002).
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I. CLASS ACTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A. Class Actions and Substantive Rights
The class action, as a procedural mechanism, may not by its terms
impact underlying substantive rights.  The Rules Enabling Act forbids
that any Rule of Civil Procedure “abridge, enlarge or modify any sub-
stantive right.”21  However, judicial decisions regularly interpret sub-
stantive rights without reference to any procedural rule.  In so doing,
courts may be influenced by the procedural background and not just
interpretation of substantive rights in a vacuum.  The advent of class
action litigation dramatically reshaped major areas of civil litigation.
Courts then interpreted underlying substantive rights in response.
The class action mechanism, governed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23, permits aggregation in which a representative of a class
may join and bind claims of persons not before the court as formal
parties.22  In the years immediately after the 1966 revisions creating
modern Rule 23, early critics noted this procedural innovation might
have a wide impact on the substance of the law.  Geoffrey Hazard
explained “substantive law is shaped and articulated by procedural
possibilities,” and particularly where common law rights tended to be
highly individualized, “the rules of the common law are legal
responses to single transactions, each hand-tailored,” and the likely
result of aggregate class action litigation would be definition of rights
in a less individualized way.23  In the first decade following the 1966
revisions, commentators focused on the rule drafters’ central proce-
dural justifications for the rule as providing the means to permit more
efficient adjudication of large numbers of claims, particularly those
with small value which otherwise would go unremedied.24  However, a
few scholars described already visible effects on how courts inter-
preted substantive law.  Hal Scott, for example, called the class action
a “catalyst” for expansive interpretation in securities fraud.25
21 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b) (2006).
22 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (“One or more members of a class may sue or be sued
as representative parties on behalf of all . . . .”).
23 Geoffrey B. Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device upon the Substantive Law,
in 58 F.R.D. 307, 307, 309 (1973).
24 William Simon, Class Actions—Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction?, in 55 F.R.D.
375, 376 (1972).
25 Hal S. Scott, The Impact of Class Actions on Rule 10b-5, in THE STRUCTURE OF
PROCEDURE 86, 86–95 (Robert M. Cover & Owen M. Fiss eds., 1979); see also Milton
Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits—The
Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971) (discusssing class
actions in antitrust context).
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One cannot attribute cause to procedure and effect to substantive
law.  Changes facilitating aggregation both in substance and proce-
dure may both have been common reactions to what Arthur Miller
called in 1979 “the mass character of contemporary American society
and the complexity of today’s substantive regulations.”26  Perhaps
aggregation was in the air.  Perhaps there was a general optimism
about public law judging and the promise of citizen suits in the courts.
Scholars noted within a few years after passage of the revisions
that courts had relaxed the requirement of a showing of “reliance,” in
securities class actions brought under § 10(b) of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act and the SEC’s Rule 10b-5.27  Showing each stock-
holder’s individualized reliance on a misrepresentation would render
an action involving thousands or hundreds of thousands of stockhold-
ers impracticable.28  In response, for “pragmatic reasons,” where “class
actions provide the only effective remedy for open market investors,”
the lower courts’ proceeded to innovate a “fraud on the market” the-
ory of aggregate reliance that “relaxed” the reliance requirement and
made securities class actions feasible.29  In 1988, the Supreme Court
endorsed the fraud on the market theory, altering the nature of proof
required to permit a generalized inquiry into what would mislead a
26 See Arthur Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and
the “Class Action Problem”, 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 666–69 (1979).
27 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005).  A plaintiff must “allege, in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities, (1) a misstatement or an omission (2) of material
fact, (3) made with scienter (4) on which plaintiff relied (5) that proximately caused
[the plaintiffs’] injury.”  Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 661 (5th
Cir. 2004).
28 The Advisory Committee noted the problem but left the issue open:
[A] fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of similar misrepre-
sentations may be an appealing situation for a class action, and it may
remain so despite the need, if liability is found, for separate determination
of the damages suffered by individuals within the class. On the other hand,
although having some common core, a fraud case may be unsuited for treat-
ment as a class action if there was material variation in the representation
made or in the kinds or degrees of reliance by the persons to whom they
were addressed.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note.
29 Simon, supra note 24, at 382 (“Courts apparently think ignoring these ele- R
ments make unmanageable cases manageable.”); see Morris v. Burchard, 51 F.R.D.
530, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing
with Reliance Requirements In Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 435, 440
(1984) (“[Courts] unwilling to destroy the utility of the class action suit in securities
fraud litigation, sought to relax or even eliminate the reliance requirement.”).
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reasonable investor.30  Of course, Congress then perceived that securi-
ties class actions became too easy to file, and heightened pleading and
other requirements.31  The Court itself acted to limit aggregation in
2005 by individualizing certain causation requirements.32
Aggregation accompanied legal change in other areas as well.33
The California Supreme Court ruled in 1971, the year that California
adopted similar class action revisions, “[f]requently numerous con-
sumers are exposed to the same dubious practice by the same seller so
that proof of the prevalence of the practice as to one consumer would
provide proof for all.”34  State courts proceeded to develop in con-
sumer cases rules of reliance that similarly permitted aggregate proof,
based in inferences or an objective reasonable person standard.35
Far more broadly, strict products liability in tort replaced the
requirement of showing individualized proof of negligence.  Similarly,
in contract law, the implied warranty of merchantability under Section
2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code replaced an objective inquiry
into the basis of the bargain, with the need to show individual reliance
on a representation made.36  Those developments, whether related to
the development of aggregate litigation or not, made “mass torts”
cases and products liability cases far more amenable to class action
resolution.
Apart from changes in definitions of substantive rights, innova-
tions in remedial law also facilitated aggregation by expanding reme-
30 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 (1988) (“With the presence of a
market, the market is interposed between seller and buyer and, ideally, transmits
information to the investor in the processed form of a market price. . . . The market is
acting as the unpaid agent of the investor, informing him that given all the informa-
tion available to it, the value of the stock is worth the market price.” (quoting In re
LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980))); Issacharoff, supra note 16, at R
1649–50.
31 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737.
32 See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 337 (2005) (rejecting rulings
that securities class action plaintiffs may adequately plead loss causation by alleging
that a misrepresentation artificially inflated the stock price at the time of purchase).
33 See Patrick Higginbotham, Class Action Litigation, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 343,
344 (1997) (“Today, the law of class actions consists of a set of legal cultures that
revolve and oscillate around distinct substantive areas of the law.  The law of class
actions in the antitrust field is different from the law of class actions in the securities
field, and the law of class actions with regard to discrimination cases is also different
in the same way.  We cannot back away from this interplay of substance and
procedure.”).
34 See Vasquez v. Superior Court, 484 P.2d 964, 968 (Cal. 1971).
35 See Issacharoff, supra note 16 at 1634, 1643–53. R
36 See id. at 1644.
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dies available to a class.  Concepts of “fluid recovery” obviated
necessity of showing individualized damages, and though the
Supreme Court rejected the approach in certain circumstances, states
have adopted it and federal courts still use the approach, particularly
to distribute damages in class actions that settle.37  Medical monitor-
ing claims permitted class-wide equitable remedies in mass tort cases,
making injunctive-relief only class actions far more favorable.38
Thus, in several substantive areas, courts relaxed common law or
statutory requirements of individualized showings.  These rulings facil-
itated class action aggregation in areas where large numbers of people
would predictably be affected by the same  conduct.  Those substan-
tive rulings explained the remarkable changes in class action practice
following the procedural changes to the federal rule when it was
revised.
B. Origins of Class Actions in Public Law Litigation
While recent class action controversies concerning mass tort liti-
gation increasingly caused commentators to examine the connection
between aggregation and the underlying substantive rights, that con-
nection remains unexplored in constitutional litigation.39  Yet a cen-
tral goal of aggregation has long been to facilitate vindication of
37 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973) (rejecting the
fluid recovery concept); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
§§ 21.66, 21.662 (4th ed. 2004). But see Six (6) Mex. Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers,
904 F.2d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Federal courts have frequently approved this
remedy [fluid recovery for distribution of unclaimed funds] in the settlement of class
actions where the proof of individual claims would be burdensome or distribution of
damages costly.”); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 179, 185–86 (2d
Cir. 1987) (“[S]ome ‘fluidity’ is permissible in the distribution of settlement pro-
ceeds.” (citations omitted)). See generally California v. Levi Strauss & Co., 75 P.2d 564
(1986) (outlining various methods of fluid recovery and providing guidance for
selecting the appropriate method).
38 See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 787–88 (3d Cir. 1994)
(outlining elements for certification of a medical monitoring claim); Linda S. Mul-
lenix, Federal Practice: Complex Litigation—Medical Monitoring, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 29, 1999,
at B17; Pankaj Venugopal, The Class Certification of Medical Monitoring Claims, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1659, 1673–74 (2002).
39 See generally Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and its Discontents: Class Settlement
Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872 (2006) (examining
“the proper relationship between aggregation and the remedial scheme set forth by
the legislature in the underlying substantive law”).  The prevalence of settlements in
the vast majority of class actions certified makes analyzing the role of substantive law
difficult. See Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the
Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 143 (1996) (“The percentage of certified
class actions terminated by a class settlement ranged from 62% to 100%, while settle-
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constitutional and civil rights.  The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
providing a class action mechanism, Rule 23, was amended in 1966 at
the civil rights era’s height.
The Advisory Committee “explained that (b)(2) was inspired by
the civil rights litigation then taking shape.”40  Rule 23(b) was crafted
to offer class-wide injunctive relief in archetypical cases “in the civil-
rights field where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully
against a class.”41  Drafter Benjamin Kaplan noted at a meeting during
the drafting of the rule that, “if by any chance the desegregation case
could be found by a judge not to be a class action after the adoption
of the rule, we would of course be in a very, very bad way.”42
Why did civil rights litigation call out for changes to the class
action mechanism?  Class actions had not been, early on, a central
part of the litigation surrounding the civil rights movement.  In the
first landmark civil rights cases, such as Brown v. Board of Education,43
civil rights lawyers brought test cases in which a carefully selected indi-
vidual plaintiff brought a claim, not a class of affected individuals.
Rulings by the Supreme Court had a stare decisis effect on all litigants.
Perhaps a class action would be superfluous.44  John Bronsteen and
Owen Fiss asked, “what is to be gained” by seeking injunctive relief
using a class action, since after all, “[i]f the named plaintiff brings suit
individually and wins, then the defendant will be bound to act in a way
that confers benefits on the entire class—to desegregate the schools—
and that obligation can easily be enforced by all the members of the
class.”45
However, the drafters of the modern Rule 23 knew that civil
rights litigants had encountered a series of obstacles that federal
courts placed in the path of individuals seeking to enjoin unconstitu-
tional racial segregation in the South.  Some federal courts raised con-
cerns whether they could order broad injunctive decrees in cases
ment rates (including stipulated dismissals) for cases not certified ranged from 20%
to 30%.”).
40 John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1419, 1433 (2003) (citation omitted).
41 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee’s note.
42 See Marcus, supra note 5, at 657 (citing Transcript of Session on Class Actions R
10 (Oct. 31, 1963–Nov. 2, 1963), microformed on CIS-7104-53 (Jud. Conf. Records,
Cong. Info. Serv.)).
43 377 U.S. 483 (1954).
44 See Arthur S. Miller, Constitutional Decisions as De Facto Class Actions: A Comment
on the Implications of Cooper v. Aaron, 58 U. DET. J. OF URB. L. 573, 574 (1981).
45 See Bronsteen & Fiss, supra note 40, at 1433. R
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brought by individual plaintiffs.46  Further, as David Marcus has care-
fully explored, “[t]o defeat desegregation litigation, most southern
state legislatures replaced de jure policies of segregation with mecha-
nisms that purported to treat blacks as individuals but invariably pro-
duced the same segregated results.”47  Judges had initially held that
such policies created individual issues and potential conflicts in pro-
posed class action litigation.48  The substantive equal protection law
post-Brown was interpreted in a way that frustrated common remedies.
Thus, as James Pfander writes,
By treating the plaintiffs as individuals . . . rather than as mem-
bers of a class, the courts played into the hands of massive resis-
tance. . . .  Class action treatment might have facilitated a speedier
challenge to such laws, cutting through the ordinary rule that indi-
viduals must exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing
suit to challenge administrative action.49
Substantive equal protection law then shifted.  Judges over time
interpreted the underlying substantive command of Brown in a way
that facilitated class actions, interpreting the Rule to require an
affirmative obligation to desegregate and not simply to offer individ-
ual students freedom of choice.  As Marcus explains, “[b]ecause it
made individual litigant characteristics substantively irrelevant, the
shift to the systemic integration interpretation of Brown facilitated the
prosecution of desegregation suits as class actions.”50
In addition, to prevent litigation regarding integration of schools
in the wake of Brown, local government in the South imposed onerous
administrative requirements to delay litigation, such as requiring
black students to apply for a transfer to the white district, and then
delaying decision or denying this application.51  Some courts had held
that if a single individual enjoined an unconstitutional government
action, then perhaps only that plaintiff could claim its benefit by suing
for contempt should the government fail to comply.  After all, absent
a class action, only named parties are bound by a judgment; due pro-
cess and standing doctrine reflect “the general prohibition on a liti-
46 See Marcus, supra note 5, at 680 (“[U]ntil 1963, when the Fifth Circuit decided R
the important case of Potts v. Flax, courts doubted that they could issue broadly appli-
cable injunctions in individual actions. . . . A student-by-student approach to desegre-
gation litigation posed enormous difficulties and all but nullified Brown.”).
47 Id. at 683.
48 Id.
49 James E. Pfander, Brown II: Ordinary Remedies for Extraordinary Wrongs, 24 LAW &
INEQ. 47, 71 (2006).
50 Marcus, supra note 5, at 688. R
51 Pfander, supra note 49, at 71. R
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gant’s raising another person’s legal rights . . . .”52  Perhaps
subsequent courts would abide by the earlier decision, but the prior
trial court decision would not be binding precedent.  Certainly, “an
injunction can benefit parties other than the parties to the litigation,”
and a court can enjoin enforcement of an unconstitutional regula-
tion, but a court has discretion whether to do so as to non-parties.53
This could raise great practical difficulties, particularly in school
desegregation cases where original plaintiffs might face threats and be
reluctant to come forward, or the case might be moot as against that
plaintiff (say if the plaintiff graduated from the school) and where
government was frequently in contempt.
A class action provides important benefits in a civil rights case
seeking injunctive relief.  A decade later, some of the practical con-
cerns concerning enforcement by non-parties would be addressed by
the Court’s decision in Parklane Hosiery,54 permitting non-mutual col-
lateral estoppel to allow non-parties to come forward and rely on the
prior judgment.55  Nevertheless, the Parklane standard is flexible and
its application not definite.  Nor can plaintiffs using preclusion pursue
contempt and directly enforce the original injunctive decree.  New
parties would have to file entirely new actions, with the application of
non-mutual issue preclusion somewhat uncertain.  Further, while gov-
ernment might voluntarily choose to abide by an injunction as to non-
parties, or simply withdraw an unconstitutional policy, should officials
not comply and non-parties try to bring a challenge, courts have often
held that non-parties are not formally bound.56  Nor might all affected
52 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
53 Doe v. Rumsfeld, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2004).  For a 1963 Fifth Circuit
case noting uncertainty in the lower courts, but concluding, that even without certify-
ing a class action, “[t]he very nature of the rights appellants seek to vindicate requires
that the decree run to the benefit not only of appellants but also for all persons simi-
larly situated,”  see Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201, 206 (5th Cir. 1963).  For addi-
tional cases expressing uncertainty about circumstances under which an injunction
may benefit non-parties, see Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)
(“[I]njunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary
to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.”); NLRB v. Express Publ’g Co., 312 U.S.
426, 435 (1941) (“A federal court has broad power to restrain acts which are of the
same type or class as unlawful acts which the court has found to have been committed
or whose commission in the future, unless enjoined, may fairly be anticipated from
the defendant’s conduct in the past.”); Rumsfeld, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 17–18 (“Govern-
ment-wide injunctive relief for plaintiffs and all individuals similarly situated can be
entirely appropriate” but “the appropriate scope is in the court’s discretion.”).
54 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
55 Id. at 333–37.
56 Some commentators have noted that class actions seeking injunctive relief may
not always be strictly necessary to practically bind government. See 7AA CHARLES ALAN
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by the noncompliance be aware of the prior settlement or judgment.
All of these reasons explain the importance of Rule 23(b)(2) for civil
rights cases seeking injunctions.
As noted, the experiences of civil rights litigants in the South
deeply concerned the drafters of Rule 23.  As then-NAACP legal direc-
tor Jack Greenberg recounts, “Civil rights and class actions have an
historic partnership.”57  Indeed, Greenberg noted:
Professor Albert Sacks, who was Associate Reporter of the revised
rules, was intimately familiar with civil rights litigation and had in
mind the role of class actions in civil rights litigation in formulating
the rule. (For years he was an instructor at legal training sessions of
the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund and was a consult-
ant to the Fund.)58
The new Rule 23, as Abram Chayes wrote, “confirmed the self-
image of public interest lawyers as spokesmen for large groupings
toward which they had duties and responsibilities different from those
of the ordinary lawyer-client relationship.”59
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY ANN KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 1785.2, 428–447 (3d ed. 2005); see also 32B AM. JUR. 2D FEDERAL COURTS § 1705
(“An action seeking declaratory or injunctive relief against state officials on the
ground of unconstitutionality of a statute or administrative practice is the archetype
of an action in which a class action designation under Rule 23(b)(2) is largely a for-
mality since the judgment would run to the benefit not only of the named plaintiffs
but also of all others similarly situated where the state officials have made it clear that
they understand the judgment to bind them with respect to all claimants.”).  How-
ever, the class action is a formality if state officials agree to be bound with respect to
all claimants. See, e.g., Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d Cir. 1973) (recogniz-
ing certification as a formality because the State agreed to be bound by the judgment
with respect to all claimants and withdrew its challenge to the policy before the
court’s ruling).  As a formal matter, non-parties are not bound by a judgment in an
individual case, and the “usual rule” is “that litigation is conducted by and on behalf
of the individual named parties only.”  Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147,
155 (1982) (quoting Califano, 442 U.S. at 700–01).  Therefore, courts in individual
cases, as noted, may or may not in their discretion extend the injunction to bar
enforcement against non-parties, depending perhaps on whether class-certification is
necessary to provide relief adequately to the named party. See Va. Soc’y for Human
Life, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 263 F.3d 379, 393 (4th Cir. 2001) (“In this case
VSHL is the only plaintiff.  An injunction covering VSHL alone adequately protects it
from the feared prosecution.”); Hernandez v. Reno, 91 F.3d 776, 781 (5th Cir. 1996)
(“Class-wide relief may be appropriate in an individual action if such is necessary to
give the prevailing party the relief to which he or she is entitled.”); supra note 57. R
57 Jack Greenberg, Civil Rights Class Actions: Procedural Means of Obtaining Sub-
stance, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 575, 577 (1997).
58 Id.
59 Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term: Foreword: Public Law Litigation and
the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 27–28 (1982).
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The drafters had two broad types of civil rights remedies in mind
when they developed the new Rule 23.60  The four threshold require-
ments of Rule 23(a) are: (1) numerosity (there must be a class so
large that “joinder of all members is impracticable”);61 (2) commonal-
ity (there must be “questions of law or fact common to the class”);62
(3) typicality (the claims or defenses brought by class representatives
“are typical . . . of the class”);63 and (4) adequacy of representation
(the class representatives “will fairly and adequately protect the inter-
est of the class.”).64  Each of those requirements can pose particular
problems for certain types of civil rights class actions.  Next, Rule 23
creates two broad types of class actions, voluntary and mandatory, and
in civil rights cases they can be described by the remedy chiefly
sought, either damages or injunctive relief.  As noted, the drafters
thought of injunctive relief class actions under Rule 23(b)(2) as arche-
typal class actions.  However, damages class actions also became an
important vehicle in civil rights actions.
1. Damages Class Actions
Consider the interests of an individual civil rights plaintiff.  That
person might be most interested in receiving financial compensation
for injuries, and not in changing the system by seeking an injunction.
Class actions seeking primarily damages remedies under can be
formed pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) when the members of the putative
class share “questions of law or fact” in common, and “a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudica-
tion of the controversy.”65  Chief Judge Michael Boudin has called
Subsection (b)(3) “the cute tiger cub that has grown into something
unexpectedly fearsome in civil rights and mass tort litigation.”66  The
chief rationale for the enactment of this provision goes to the core of
the efficiency that the modern class action rule promises—to make
litigation of small claims economically feasible.  As the Supreme Court
has explained, “[w]here it is not economically feasible to obtain relief
within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual
60 See Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497
(1969) (“The reform of Rule 23 was intended to shake the law of class actions free of
abstract categories contrived from . . . bloodless words . . . and to rebuild the law on
functional lines . . . .”).
61 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
62 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
63 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
64 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
65 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
66 Tardiff v. Knox Cnty., 365 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2004).
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suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective
redress unless they may employ the class-action device.”67
Despite their benefits, damages class actions raise dangers that
attorneys may be opportunistically motivated by their recovery rather
than the interests of class members.68  Unlike class actions brought
under Rule 23(b)(1) and (2), Rule 23 mandates that all putative dam-
ages class members under (b)(3) be afforded notice and an opportu-
nity to opt-out.69
As will be discussed below, rulings by the Court after the passage
of the modern Rule 23 made litigation of damages issues in civil rights
cases more complex.  In contrast to private law cases discussed above,
which at times obviate necessity for individualized proof of damages,
§ 1983, the core federal civil rights right of action has been inter-
preted to require individual proof of a plaintiff’s “actual damages”
though also permitting symbolic recovery of nominal damages.70
2. Injunctive Relief Class Actions
As described, Rule 23(b)(2) permits a mandatory class action if
plaintiffs seek primarily injunctive or declaratory relief.71  The provi-
sion is “mandatory” because plaintiffs need not be provided with indi-
vidual notice and an opportunity to opt-out,72 as the remedy sought
would—as a practical matter—bind all parties.  This provision was
“designed specifically for civil rights cases seeking broad declaratory
67 Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
68 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1348–62 (1995); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s
Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class
and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986); Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy)
Future of Class Actions, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 923, 928–29 (1998); Jonathan R. Macey & Geof-
frey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Eco-
nomic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991); Jack B.
Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469 (1994).
69 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
70 See also Daly v. Harris, 209 F.R.D. 180, 197 n.5 (D. Haw. 2002) (“[T]he fluid
recovery system, as a method of aggregating damages as opposed to a distribution
method, would not be appropriate here since Section 1983 requires proof of actual
damages.”).
71 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; supra text accompanying notes 56–59. R
72 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 833–34 & n.13 (1999). See generally
Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 77
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057 (2002) (examining the right to opt out in the context of
class actions in which a majority of the class members’ claims do not warrant individ-
ual prosecution).
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or injunctive relief.”73  As a result, injunctive classes “have been certi-
fied in a legion of civil rights cases where commonality findings were
based primarily on the fact that defendant’s conduct [was] central to
the claims of all class members irrespective of their individual circum-
stances and the disparate effects of the conduct.”74  An injunction, as
a practical matter, may benefit the entire class, requiring less individ-
ual participation.
Of course, an injunction may also be sought by an individual per-
son in a challenge to the constitutionality of a government law, policy,
or practice.  But as noted, extending the benefits of that injunction to
a class of similarly situated individuals can face a series of obstacles,
including that courts may not grant an injunction so broad as to bar
enforcement of the unconstitutional rule or practice against the class
if it is an individual case.  In addition, class members can be compen-
sated if there are also damages sought in addition to an injunction.
Nevertheless, the special treatment of injunctive class actions in Rule
23 reflects how injunctions provide a remedy that benefits a group, if
not the public, regardless of the degree to which all affected actually
participate in the litigation.
Injunctive relief-only class actions might not be economical
where the injunctive remedy does not chiefly include damages to com-
pensate class members and from which attorneys could obtain a con-
tingency fee.75  The drafters of Rule 23 may have had in mind
organizations like the NAACP that were nonprofits and not chiefly
seeking economic rewards through litigation.  However, Congress
intervened to make the economics of such litigation more attractive
by passing a statute adopting a “private attorneys general” rational,
seeking to entice lawyers by entitling award of attorney’s fees to “pre-
vailing” civil rights parties.76
The Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes decision may have an outsized
impact on Rule 23(b)(2) in that it appears to more sharply require a
remedial choice.  That is, all of the Justices agreed that 23(b)(2) can-
73 2 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4.11, at 62
(4th ed. 2002); see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee’s note (1966 amend.)
(“Illustrative are various actions in the civil-rights field where a party is charged with
discriminating unlawfully against a class . . . .”); George Rutherglen, Title VII Class
Actions, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 688, 688 (1980).
74 Baby Neal ex rel. Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 57 (3d Cir. 1994).
75 See Thomas E. Williging et al., supra note 39, at 91 (reporting study results that R
“the median fee award was considerably smaller for (b)(2) class counsel when com-
pared to fees in nonsecurities (b)(3) cases”).
76 See Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)
(2006).
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not be used to secure an injunction in a case where there is more than
just incidental monetary relief.  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg began
her dissent by stating that “[t]he class in this case, I agree with the
Court, should not have been certified under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 23(b)(2)” where the plaintiffs sought “monetary relief that is
not merely incidental to any injunctive or declaratory relief that might
be available.”77  The majority opinion authored by Justice Antonin
Scalia did not precisely reach whether an injunctive relief class action
could include some damages to compensate class members.  Instead,
it concluded that not only was backpay a form of monetary relief,78
but that it was the “individualized” nature of the monetary relief that
precluded resolution under Rule 23(b)(2).  Justice Scalia emphasized
how “the Rule reflects a series of decisions involving challenges to
racial segregation—conduct that was remedied by a single classwide
order.”79  Therefore, the Court held that “the combination of individ-
ualized and classwide relief” was inconsistent with the remedial choice
dictated by the structure of Rule 23, which separates the three sub-
sections of 23(b) based on the type of remedy sought.80  The Court
interpreted that separation to be strict.81
Civil rights litigants must pursue compensation and an injunction
in separate actions—lest their desire to obtain monetary compensa-
tion for their injuries result in dismissal of the action seeking to enjoin
future civil rights violations.  In each case, the litigants must make a
remedial choice.  Forcing plaintiffs to use 23(b)(3) when seeking
compensation may promote greater fairness in the distribution of
monetary remedies, since 23(b)(3) requires notice and provision of
opt-out rights.  However, faced with that choice, fewer plaintiffs law-
yers, except perhaps at nonprofit firms, may choose to bring injunc-
tive relief-only class actions in which compensation will be slight.82
77 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.
dissenting).
78 For criticism of this aspect of the Court’s ruling, see Suzette M. Malveaux, How
Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 34, 45
(2011) (“The Court’s unanimous conclusion that back pay was not appropriate for
the type of class action certified in Dukes was surprising. This gratuitous decision effec-
tively reversed almost a half-century of Title VII jurisprudence permitting back pay
under such circumstances.”).
79 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 2559.
82 See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2013) (describing how some courts have required plaintiffs to assert all possi-
ble claims in a class action, in the guise of scrutinizing adequacy of representation,
and potentially preventing plaintiffs from later asserting Section 1983 suits, although
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Enjoining constitutional violations will have to be its own reward—
that and statutory attorneys fees—which, of course, Congress could
enhance to make 23(b)(2) actions more attractive after Wal-Mart.  So
far, this suggests that Wal-Mart may reduce the economic incentives to
bring 23(b)(2) class actions, but it will not affect classic injunctive-
relief only civil rights class actions under 23(b)(2).  As I will develop,
that may not turn out to be right either, for some types of constitu-
tional rights.
C. Aggregation of Defendants in Civil Rights Cases
Government interests may be aggregated when defendants are
joined together.  In many civil rights cases, the plaintiffs sue several
individual government officers, who are thus joined in one lawsuit,
though they may retain separate counsel.  They may also sue the gov-
ernment entity itself, if it is a local (municipal) entity and not the
state, which enjoys sovereign immunity.  One unnoticed feature of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services of
New York,83 which permitted a municipal entity to be sued, was to pro-
mote one type of aggregation of defendants in civil rights cases, by
permitting suits against the government entity responsible for policy,
supervision, and training.
The Court, however, increasingly individualized civil rights litiga-
tion in cases seeking monetary damages against individually named
government defendants.  The Court changed the qualified immunity
standard so that a judge need not any longer ask whether the govern-
ment official acted with subjective intent to violate the constitution,
which required a highly individualized showing.84  Instead, a judge
asks an only slightly less individualized question, requiring the plain-
tiff to show that no reasonable official would have acted as the defen-
dant did in light of then-clearly established federal law.  Even if several
officials were involved in alleged unconstitutional acts, the inquiry
noting that some courts have not done so); see also Edward F. Sherman, “Abandoned
Claims” in Class Actions: Implications for Preclusion and Adequacy of Counsel, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 483, 484–85 (2011) (discussing the preclusive effect of separating class
equitable claims from individual damage claims).  As Klonoff points out, the Court in
Wal-Mart did suggest that the “strategy of including only back pay claims” in the case
could create a “possibility” that their “compensatory-damages claims would be pre-
cluded by litigation they had no power to hold themselves apart from . . . .”  Klonoff,
supra, at 60 (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2559). As Klonoff describes, the “notion
that lawyers must assert all conceivable claims to avoid adequacy attacks . . . is the
antithesis of effective advocacy.” Id. at 62.
83 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
84 See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009).
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must be conducted as to each individually.  Thus, qualified immunity
doctrine does more than protect officers and reduce costs of constitu-
tional innovation.85  Qualified immunity doctrine also limits the effi-
ciency gain of joinder of multiple individual officers as defendants.  In
addition, lower courts have held one must show a defendant’s “per-
sonal involvement” in the violation, which for supervisors may require
a showing that they either participated in the relevant acts, or con-
doned it, such as by acting with “deliberate indifference.”86
In other respects, the Court has also ruled so as to individualize
damages awards as against the Government.  The Court requires that
an individual officer have violated the Constitution as a predicate to a
suit that also seeks to hold the municipal entity liable.  The Court has
already increasingly required proof that the claimed constitutional
violation was, if not the product of a facially unconstitutional policy,
then representative of some larger pattern of violations or “deliberate
indifference” on the part of the Government entity.  The Court’s
recent Connick v. Thompson87 decision is an example, finding that a
lack of policies and training on the fundamental duty of prosecutors
to disclose exculpatory evidence, together with past instances of viola-
tions, did not show that the office itself was sufficiently at fault.88  The
ruling may not surprise observers of the Court’s Monell jurisprudence,
which sets a high bar for what constitutes a subject so “obvious” that it
would be considered deliberately indifferent for policymakers to fail
to effectively train or supervise on it.
The result is that absent a facially unconstitutional policy, civil
rights litigants must show violations by individual government
actors—but also a high degree of aggregate responsibility by the entity
itself.  In contrast, government policies (and to a lesser extent prac-
tices) may be enjoined, affecting government in the aggregate, but as
will be developed in the Parts that follow, the ways that some constitu-
tional rights are defined, and remedial case law, may make injunctive
relief remedies far less effective than they should be.
85 See generally Jeffries, supra note 17 at 87 (recognizing that a right-remedy gap is R
embedded in our current doctrine of constitutional law).
86 See, e.g., Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is well settled in
this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional depriva-
tions is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” (quotation omitted));
Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992–93 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that supervisors
must act “either knowingly or with deliberate, reckless indifference”).
87 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
88 Id.
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D. Benefits of Aggregation in Civil Rights Cases
To briefly preview the discussion in Part III regarding the benefits
of aggregation in civil rights cases, in either type of class action, for
damages or injunctive relief, aggregation provides a series of procedu-
ral benefits.  First, the “policy at the very core” of aggregation is
achieving efficiency through economies of scale.89  In situations where
low-value cases would not be “economically feasible” if brought alone,
the Court notes “aggrieved persons may be without any effective
redress unless they may employ the class action-device.”90  Not only
plaintiffs, but defendants may benefit by avoiding piecemeal litigation,
and in the same way courts can benefit from economies of scale.91
Further, civil rights cases may frequently involve rights violations that
are difficult to quantify and do not result in large amounts of individ-
ual damages.
Aggregation may result in greater equality in results.92  As will be
discussed, the Court has often complained of the ad hoc nature of
constitutional tort litigation and the danger that local government will
face inconsistent verdicts or be held to unexpected constitutional
standards.  Aggregate treatment can regularize litigation and avoid
burdensome, piecemeal litigation with inconsistent results for plain-
tiffs, and for government actors.  In cases that seek an injunction, an
individually obtained injunction would practically resolve the constitu-
tional question.
Aggregation may also improve the legitimacy and the quality of
adjudication in civil rights cases, even in those seeking solely an
injunction.  A class action may permit greater participation by affected
89 See Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The
policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that
small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action
prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating the
relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an
attorney’s) labor.”).
90 Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
91 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note (1966 amend.) (“The
burden that separate suits would impose on the party opposing the class, or upon the
court calendars, may also fairly be considered.”).
92 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note (1966 amend.)
(“Actions by or against a class provide a ready and fair means of achieving unitary
adjudication.”); see also In re Ephedra Prods. Liab. Litig., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1375
(J.P.M.L. 2004) (“Centralization under Section 1407 is thus necessary in order to
avoid duplication of discovery, prevent inconsistent or repetitive pretrial rulings, and
conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel and the judiciary.”); Alexandra D.
Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula”, 90 TEX. L. REV. 571, 571 (2012) (advocating
outcome equality by using more statistical analysis).
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parties than through intervention in a suit by a single plaintiff.  Aggre-
gation may also provide improved access to representation; better law-
yers may be attracted to a class case involving larger issues and greater
financial rewards. Similarly, plaintiffs may have access to better expert
assistance given the stakes in a class action seeking injunctive relief.
Plaintiffs and defendants may have better access to information.
Civil rights cases seeking to demonstrate patterns of violations and the
need for injunctive relief or even structural reform might benefit from
pooling of information gathered from class members, as well as the
deterrent effect of collective participation (and the award of class-wide
attorneys’ fees).93  As the Second Circuit explained in a class action
challenging strip searches of detainees: “Absent class certification and
its attendant class-wide notice procedures, most of these individuals—
who potentially number in the thousands—likely never will know that
defendants violated their clearly established constitutional rights, and
thus never will be able to vindicate those rights.”94  The Supreme
Court has permitted in some circumstances, consideration of aggre-
gate evidence as part of a decision whether to enjoin government
actors.95  Finally, plaintiffs and defendants may have better access to
judicial resources if judges focus more of their attention on class
actions, in part perhaps due to the procedural steps built into Rule 23.
Aggregation also has costs.  It may not be effective or allowed
where the underlying law defines access to relief as individual, as in
the early post-Brown cases.  If individual entitlement to relief varies,
there may be outright conflicts of interest that would make aggrega-
tion unattractive or problematic.  Indeed, a class-wide injunction may
be objectionable to members of a class—although they may intervene
to object whether it is a class action or individual case.  If representa-
tion is not adequate, the ramifications for plaintiffs in a class action
may be greater.  Certainly, the costs of a class action remedy may be
far greater and more burdensome on the government in a class
action, or on private actors in a statutory civil rights case against a
corporation.
II. INDIVIDUALIZED AND AGGREGATED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
As one group of researchers concluded, “[t]he data tell us that
the world of class actions . . . was primarily a world of Rule 23(b)(3) damage
93 See, e.g., Lesley Frieder Wolf, Note, Evading Friendly Fire: Achieving Class Certifica-
tion After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1847, 1848 & n.4 (2000).
94 In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 229 (2d Cir. 2006).
95 Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (providing an example of a case where
statistical, historical, other aggregate evidence were all considered).
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class actions, not the world of civil rights and other social policy reform
litigation that . . . the 1966 rule drafters had in mind.”96  In examining
cases brought in 1995 and 1996, they found that civil rights cases rep-
resented 14% of reported opinions.97  The most recent Federal Judi-
cial Center study of class actions examining the impact of the Class
Actions Fairness Act (CAFA), and examining federal filings from 2001
to 2007, found a “noticeable decline” in civil rights class actions, of
seventeen percent in absolute numbers, and from 14% to 7% of total
class action filings.98  The vast majority of class actions filed in federal
courts were labor cases, chiefly under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) and Employment Retirement Security Act (ERISA), constitut-
ing 27% of federal class actions, securities class actions (13%), and
contract class actions (10%).99
If that decline is real and in fact represents a consistent trend and
not a temporary aberration, there may still be a host of reasons for
that observed decline, including, for example, changes in substantive
law, procedural law (like the CAFA), or in background compliance
with civil rights and constitutional law.  However, though civil rights
class actions have not constituted a large proportion of the class
action practice in federal courts, the perception remains that civil
rights cases present “easy” issues for courts and are routinely certified
as class actions.100  This view is mistaken, at least concerning some
constitutional rights.  In a range of contexts, the Supreme Court acted
to sharply individualize the inquiry into whether a class action is
appropriate in a civil rights case.  The relationship between aggrega-
tion and underlying civil rights is both complex and sometimes
counterintuitive.  The sections that follow develop a series of constitu-
tional rights that the Court individualized, each of which exists along-
side related theories, which more easily permit aggregate litigation.
Second, I will discuss rulings that individualized remedies for rights
violations.  Third, I will describe how in response to some of these
96 DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS ACTION
DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 52–53 (2000).
97 Id.
98 THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE, III, THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION
FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 10 (2006), available at http://www.classactionlitigation.com/
CAFA_Report_0906.pdf (presenting report of results of long term study of federal
class action filings from July 1, 2001 through June 30, 2005).
99 Id.
100 See Williging et al., supra note 39, at 86–88 (concluding based on study of four R
federal district courts that civil rights class actions were “routine” and “easy cases” that
are readily certified as class actions, though noting the small number of such cases in
the study group).
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decisions, Congress has intervened with statutes that facilitate aggrega-
tion but also by enacting statutes that seek to limit aggregation.
A. Individualized Constitutional Rights
A series of constitutional rights remain highly individualized and
therefore difficult to assert in damages class actions that require com-
monality and predominance.  The Supreme Court individualizes
rights in a variety of ways: regarding the definition of the right viola-
tion itself, or regarding other elements of the right such as causation,
or regarding defenses that the government might raise to rebut pre-
sumptions of a violation.  The Court may do so to simply make it diffi-
cult to obtain a remedy for a violation of a right except in egregious
cases.  The Court may view the right as requiring a case-specific
inquiry, based on text or purpose or other interpretative methods.
The Court may view a brighter-line rule as unduly burdensome on
government.  In contrast, the Court may seek to create brighter-line to
give notice to government.  As Fred Schauer has prominently devel-
oped, general rules may be advantageous for a host of reasons.101
They more readily protect the interests of the broader public.  They
may be more difficult to evade and may simplify proof.  They provided
clearer notice.  On the other hand, they may be less adaptable and
flexible.  Difficult substantive choices all impact the scaling of a right
and therefore the ability to pursue aggregate remedies.  It would be
far beyond the scope of this piece to comprehensively describe differ-
ences as to the individualized or aggregated definitions of various con-
stitutional rights.  Instead, I provide a set of particularly illustrative
examples to show differences in the Court’s approach to the sub-
stance of the constitutional right and the impact on aggregate
litigation.
1. The Eighth Amendment
Requirements that a plaintiff satisfy a showing of subjective gov-
ernment intent to violate the constitution render the inquiry a highly
individualized one.  In Eighth Amendment cases involving prison con-
ditions, the Court has ruled that plaintiff must satisfy both an objec-
tive prong and a subjective prong that the government official (usually
a prison guard) acted with “deliberate indifference,” under the cir-
cumstances.102  Eighth Amendment claims by prisoners commonly
101 FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES (1993).
102 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (“[T]he official must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”); Amy Laderberg, Note,
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involve allegations concerning prison conditions such as provision of
adequate medical care,103 personal security from violence by other
inmates, excessive force by corrections officers (which requires a
showing of an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”),104 and
punitive measures taken against prisoners.
The Court in Wilson v. Seiter105 specifically rejected the argument
advanced by the plaintiffs that there should be a different showing in
a case alleging systemic violations and not a single act.  The plaintiffs
had hoped to avoid the need to show that officials acted with a partic-
ular malicious mental state, but rather to rely on evidence of systemic
violations.  The Court held that there was no difference between the
need to show an individual official’s state of mind in a “one-time” ver-
sus a “systemic” violation, arguing that the word “punishment” in the
Eighth Amendment implies a mental state that must be present to
make out a claim.106  However, the Court also cited to policy reasons
supporting individualization of the inquiry, where in particular cases
there may be “composite conditions” that resist “pigeonholing.”107
The Court explained that
[u]ndoubtedly deprivations inflicted upon all prisoners are, as a
policy matter, of greater concern than deprivations inflicted upon
particular prisoners, but we see no basis whatever for saying that the
one is a “condition of confinement” and the other is not—much
less that the one constitutes “punishment” and the other does
not.108
As a result, plaintiffs attempting to bring a class action concern-
ing prison conditions must show that officials engaged in “deliberate
indifference,” both showing that the conditions are objectively uncon-
stitutionally inadequate and subjectively manifesting deliberate indif-
The “Dirty Little Secret”: Why Class Actions Have Emerged as the Only Viable Option for
Women Inmates Attempting to Satisfy the Subjective Prong of the Eighth Amendment in Suits for
Custodial Sexual Abuse, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 323, 329 (1998).
103 See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
104 See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1992).
105 501 U.S. 294 (1991)
106 See id. at 300 (“The source of the intent requirement is not the predilections of
this Court, but the Eighth Amendment itself, which bans only cruel and unusual
punishment.”).
107 See id. at 300–02 (“Eighth Amendment claims based on official conduct that
does not purport to be the penalty formally imposed for a crime require inquiry into
state of mind . . .”). But see Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. District of
Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994) (allowing fact finder to make inferences
about prison official’s state of mind by examining circumstantial evidence).
108 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 299 n.1.
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ference through an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”109
Those requirements pose problems where prisoners would need to
show that policymakers possessed “deliberate indifference” towards
the entire class.110  Those objective and subjective requirements both
pose obstacles to aggregate handling of cases involving medical treat-
ment of prisoners, although many prisons have special mental health
or medical needs.111  As one court explained in denying class certifica-
tion in a case alleging inadequate prison dental care:
Cases involving personal injury and inadequate medical care are
particularly fact specific . . . .  In order to prove the objective ele-
ment of an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must first show
that he had a condition that required dental care; second, that he
did not receive adequate dental care; third, that he suffered signifi-
cant injury or harm; and fourth that the injury or harm was causally
related to the inadequate care.  Each plaintiff’s case would necessa-
rily be different.112
Similarly, litigation regarding prison discipline or use of force or
security from self-harm or harm by other inmates may require “exami-
nation of the unique circumstances surrounding each incident
alleged to constitute a constitutional deprivation.”113  In addition, the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)114 imposes limitations on the
ability to obtain injunctive remedies to correct systemic prison condi-
tions deficiencies.115
More generalized claims regarding prison policies may be more
readily litigated through class actions, or for that matter, in individual
suits seeking injunctions.  The Court has cautioned that remedies
should be narrowly tailored to any constitutional violation and Con-
109 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).
110 See Lowery v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 16 F.3d 1220 (6th Cir. 1994).
111 See Maureen Mullen Dove, Law and Fact of Health Care in Prisons, 44 DEC. MD.
B.J. 4 (2011) (generally discussing the status of prisoners’ healthcare rights).
112 Smith v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 2008 WL 1995059, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 2008)
(No. 07C3659); see also Shook v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2006 WL 1801379, at *4 (D.
Colo. June 28, 2006) (No. 02-cv-00651-RPM) (denying class certification in Eighth
Amendment challenge to provision of mental health services in Colorado Springs jail,
noting “inherent complexities in determining what persons present a need for treat-
ment of mental disorders while confined”).
113 Shook, 2006 WL 1801379 at *9.
114 Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2006).
115 For example, the court must find prospective relief “narrowly drawn” and such
relief “shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal
right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
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gress has limited access to such remedies in the PLRA.116  However,
some violations may even, according to the Court, be considered “‘in
combination’ . . . when they have a mutually enforcing effect that pro-
duces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as
food, warmth, or exercise—for example, a low cell temperature at
night combined with a failure to issue blankets.”117  Such an inquiry is
more easily conducted in the aggregate under substantive due process
decisions.
Perhaps due to the dramatic evidence of systemic deficiencies
compiled in the record by the lower court, and perhaps because the
state itself “conceded that deficiencies in prison medical care violated
prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights,” the Supreme Court in the
October 2010 term in Brown v. Plata upheld a remarkable injunctive
order in a class action for the release of thousands of California
prisoners.118
Thus, class actions premised on prison conditions may be pur-
sued and aggregate proof may be relevant.  However, in contrast to
suits based on general conditions such as overcrowding, food, and
sanitation premised on a highly deferential “reasonably safe condi-
tions” standard, class actions based on conditions that the courts have
considered more individual in nature, such as personal safety or ade-
quate medical care, do not as readily receive class treatment (with
extreme cases like Brown v. Plata as perhaps the exception).  Settle-
ments or consent decrees could potentially encompass such addi-
tional issues, but aggregate relief may be far more difficult to pursue
for such theories standing alone.
2. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment establishes a series of rights commonly
the subject of § 1983 litigation, including the requirement that arrests
may be made only if police have probable cause, the prohibition on
unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court’s rule that a “stop and
frisk” must be supported by “reasonable suspicion,”119 and regulation
of police use of force, including deadly force.120  As to some of these
116 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
117 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991); see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307, 314–25 (1982) (holding that the State has substantive due process obliga-
tion to ensure safety of involuntarily committed mental health patients). See generally
Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same).
118 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1922, 1926 (2011).
119 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10, 37 (1968).
120 See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (discussing the use of force in a
high speed chase).
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rights, the constitutional text arguably calls for an individualized
inquiry.  For example, the concept of “probable cause” implies an
individualized question whether a particular search or seizure was rea-
sonable under the circumstances.  Perhaps to obtain damages for a
violation, an individual inquiry must be conducted, which would tend
to frustrate aggregate treatment.  Courts have denied class certifica-
tion for classes of individuals alleging false arrest, for that very rea-
son.121  Alternatively, however, courts could define classes of searches
and seizures that are per se unreasonable, which could then support
aggregate litigation.  The Court has adopted both approaches
depending on the context, making some Fourth Amendment class
action litigation common and most quite rare.
For example, the Court has reaffirmed that in the context of
police use of deadly force the inquiry is context-specific and does not
forbid the use of particular police practices; a court must examine the
totality of the “facts and circumstances of each particular case.”122
Class actions may be easier to bring in the situation where a large
group of people, say at a political demonstration, were subjected to,
say, common “command decisions to disperse the crowd.”123  Other-
wise, however, each individual use of force must be evaluated on its
own terms.  Class actions regarding the use of excessive force, there-
fore, are quite rare; as one court explained, “[c]laims of excessive
physical force require a case-by-case analysis of the circumstances in
order to determine whether the amount of force used in each scena-
rio was commensurate with the perceived need for force.”124  One
would have to show that police behaved in the same unconstitution-
ally excessive way in similar-enough circumstances so as to justify class-
wide relief.  As a result, the bread and butter of § 1983 practice, litiga-
tion of claims of excessive police force, focuses on individual incidents
and individual compensation, and rarely on issues raised in class
actions, regarding systemic police policy or practices.
121 See, e.g., McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 741 F.2d 1406, 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he
liability determination in the present case is likely to turn upon highly individualized
proof, [where] probable cause may have existed for . . . some putative class
members.”).
122 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
123 Multi-Ethnic Immigrant Workers Org. Network v. City of Los Angeles, 246
F.R.D. 621, 635 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
124 Jones ‘El v. Berge, 2001 WL 34379611, at *14 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 14, 2001) (No.
00-C-421-C) (“Because the inquiry is highly individualized, plaintiffs’ claim that the
physical force used against mentally ill inmates at Supermax is excessive does not pass
the typicality or commonality prerequisites to class certification under [Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure] 23(a).”).
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For other Fourth Amendment rights, the constitutional text does
not speak to whether individual fact-specific showings must be made.
The Court interprets the right to require such a showing, at least
under some theories of liability.  The Court holds that a stop and frisk
must be supported by individualized reasonable suspicion, based on
the circumstances of the individual stop.125  That Fourth Amendment
doctrine provides police with “enormous discretion.”126 The type of
class action brought commonly on behalf of arrestees relates not to
whether the arrest itself was supported by probable cause, but the situ-
ation where law enforcement adopts a “blanket policy” that does not
make a reasonable suspicion judgment at all—such as a policy of strip-
searching all detainees regardless whether the officers possessed rea-
sonable suspicion (and in that context, the Court’s ruling in Florence v.
County of Burlington made such suits far more difficult by holding that
at least for those placed in the general population, such blanket strip-
search policies are constitutional).127  Class actions alleging racial pro-
filing, bringing Fourth Amendment but also Equal Protection claims
125 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
126 See David Rudovsky, Litigating Civil Rights Cases to Reform Racially Biased Criminal
Justice Practices, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97, 107 (2007).
127 Florence v. County of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).  For class actions
predating that ruling, see, for example, In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d
219, 229–30 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting class definition “referenced only defendants’
‘blanket policy,’ thus avoiding questions of probable cause” and that though the ques-
tion remains “whether, regardless of the policy, some plaintiffs were strip searched
based upon ‘reasonable and contemporaneously held suspicion,’” that defense “‘does
not . . . foreclose class certification’” (citations omitted)); Tardiff v. Knox Cnty., 365
F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[T]he individualized-suspicion issue will arise only in a
limited number of cases, assuming always that plaintiffs can establish as a background
fact the existence of an improperly broad strip search rule, policy[,] or custom.”);
Eddleman v. Jefferson Cnty., 1996 WL 495013, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 29, 1996) (No. 95-
5394) (certifying class in which strip searched plaintiffs had been arrested for “minor,
nonviolent offenses”); Bame v. Dillard, 2008 WL 2168393 (D.D.C. May 22, 2008) (No.
05-1833 (RMC)) (certifying case in which strip searches, not arrests, were litigated);
Calvin v. Sheriff of Will Cnty., 2004 WL 1125922, at *3–5 & n.2 (N.D. Ill. May 17,
2004) (03-C-3086) (“[I]n the event that defendants believe that specific searches or
classes of searches had a reasonable antecedent justification, defendants are not pre-
cluded from offering proof that the subjects of those searches should be excluded
from the class.”); Maneely v. City of Newburgh, 208 F.R.D. 69, 78–79 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(denying class certification as to constitutionality of individual searches, but granting
as to alleged policy of strip searching without reasonable suspicion); Doe v. Calumet
City, 754 F. Supp. 1211, 1220 n.22 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (“[I]f [defendant] believed that
any specific searches or classes of searches had a reasonable antecedent justification,
[defendant] could have offered proof that the subjects of those searches should be
excluded from the class, but it has failed to do that.”). But see Noon v. Sailor, 2000
WL 684219, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 17, 2000) (No. NA99-0056-C-H/G) (denying certifi-
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have been brought as well, and despite challenges in underlying con-
stitutional and remedial standards, some have resulted in consent
decrees, often requiring data collection to monitor the use of race in
policing.128  Sufficient common issues surrounding police policies
may have made settlement the best outcome for all sides, at least when
they mainly require investigating the problem further.  Additional
class actions challenging police practices have been certified in cases
where plaintiffs could make strong showings, based on statistics or
information about department practices, that a specific central policy
led to a pattern of unconstitutional stops, searches, or arrests.129
In other circumstances the Court declares a prophylactic rule
that avoids the question whether individual circumstances supported
probable cause.  Such bright-line rules facilitate aggregate relief.  For
example, in Gerstein v. Pugh, former detainees brought a class action
seeking to challenge a policy of pre-trial detention without a warrant
and without an opportunity for a probable cause determination by a
judge.130  The Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires not
that the particular facts of each case be examined before a class action
could be maintained, but that the policy of not granting hearings pre-
trial was itself unconstitutional, and that the Constitution requires
cation in strip searches case, citing need to “consider all the circumstances of the
individual arrest, detention, and search”).
128 See, e.g., Daniels v. City of New York, 2007 WL 2077150 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2007)
(No. 99 Civ. 1695(SAS)) (requiring New York Police Department to provide plaintiffs
with racial profiling data on a quarterly basis); Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Pro-
filing, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 64–74 (2001) (summarizing Supreme Court
jurisprudence related to racial profiling); Rudovsky, supra note 126 at 114–15 (dis- R
cussing constitutional standing in cases where there is an official “policy” to racially
profile).  Far more consent decrees have been the product of DOJ enforcement
actions under 42 U.S.C. § 14141. See infra notes 230–31; see, e.g., Consent Decree,
United States v. Los Angeles, (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2001) (No. 00-11769 GAF), available
at http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/final_consent_decree.pdf.
129 For a post-Wal-Mart ruling certifying a class action alleging racial profiling by
the New York City Police Department (shortly after the expiration of the consent
degree in Daniels, 2007 WL 2077150) and citing to “overwhelming and indisputable
evidence” of a “centralized” NYPD policy concerning police stops, see Floyd v. City of
New York, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2012) (1:08-cv-01034-SAS-HBP).  For additional class
certifications in cases raising Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to police
policies, see, for example, Stinson v. City of New York, 2012 WL 1450553 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 23, 2012) (No. 10 Civ. 4228 (RWS)); Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, 836 F. Supp.2d
959, 977 (D. Ariz. 2011); Morrow v. Washington, 277 F.R.D. 172, 192–94 (E.D. Tex.
2011). But see Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Div. of U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 2012 WL 1344417 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2012) (No. 07 Civ. 8224 (KBF))
(denying class certification for Latinos in New York area who have or will be subject to
Immigration and Customs Enforcement home raid operation).
130 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
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that there must be “a timely judicial determination of probable cause
as a prerequisite to detention.”131  Such cases suggest bright-line rules
can predictably facilitate class actions where officials cross the line—
they also have the advantage that they provide greater notice to offi-
cials so that they need not cross that line.
3. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
The Court has repeatedly stated that lawsuits involving claims of
race discrimination “are often by their very nature class suits, involving
classwide wrongs.”132  For almost a decade following the 1966 revi-
sions, “employment discrimination lawsuits were routinely certified as
class actions based on the rationale that such claims were inherently
of a class nature, and presumptively appropriate for class certifica-
tion.”133  This practice of reflexively certifying “across-the-board” class
actions changed as the Court began to emphasize “careful attention to
the requirements of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23.”134
The Court explained that “[t]he mere fact that a complaint
alleges racial or ethnic discrimination does not in itself ensure that
the party who has brought the lawsuit will be an adequate representa-
tive of those who may have been the real victims of that discrimina-
tion.”135  Further, the Supreme Court in General Telephone Co. of
Southwest v. Falcon, while stating that class actions are most appropriate
in race discrimination cases, where “racial discrimination is by defini-
tion class discrimination,” ruled that courts must strictly police
whether the specific type of discrimination suffered by class represent-
atives was shared by the entire group.136  The Court ruled that as to
the named plaintiff, though he “was passed over for promotion when
several less deserving whites were advanced” which might support an
individual claim, it did not support a class action regarding promotion
practices in the division more generally, or regarding other employ-
ment practices such as hiring policies.137  Thus, “to bridge that gap,”
between individual discrimination and group harm, a plaintiff “must
prove much more than the validity of his own claim.”138  Today it may
seem obvious that a named plaintiff cannot sue on behalf of others
131 Id.  at 126.
132 E. Tex. Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977).
133 Charles Mishkind, Alison Marshall & Walter Connolly, The Big Risks: Class
Actions and Pattern and Practice Cases, 591 PUB. LAW INST. 329, 338 (1998).
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Gen. Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982).
137 Id. at 158.
138 Id. at 157–58.
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who faced a completely different type of discrimination.  However, at
the time, the effect of the Falcon decision was to end the practice in
some Circuits of routinely certifying civil rights class actions targeting
general practices of discrimination, and instead focusing the district
court on narrower practices supported by evidence of policies or pat-
terns.139 Circuits do still permit challenges to generally pervasive dis-
crimination, but following Falcon, they insist on evidence of such
broad patterns.140
The Court’s Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes decision will further
increase the insistence on an individualized inquiry, even in Rule
23(b)(2) cases pursuing injunctions, including by focusing courts on
evidence of focused patterns of discrimination, and perhaps limited to
smaller workplaces.  The Court in Dukes heavily relied on its ruling
more than three decades earlier in Falcon, beginning its analysis of the
Rule 23(a) commonality requirement applicable to all class actions by
noting “[t]his Court’s opinion in Falcon describes how the commonal-
ity issue must be approached,” and then detailing the Falcon ruling.141
However, the Court’s focus in Falcon and Dukes on whether the
individuals adequately represent a larger group has a very different
impact depending on the context.  Perhaps Dukes is less trans-substan-
tive than the Court suggested.  Whether members of a group have
enough in common depends how the court characterizes the underly-
ing substantive right and harm it seeks to protect.  Equal protection
claims may be individualized—but only under some theories of liabil-
ity.  In cases in which there is no showing that the decision maker
acted using an explicit racial classification, a more individualized
showing must be made.  The Court in Washington v. Davis142 rejected
reliance solely on aggregate statistics showing a racially disparate
impact, requiring some showing of an intent to discriminate or dis-
criminatory purpose.  In other decisions the Court made clear that
there must be “stark” evidence that race is a “motivating factor” in the
government decision.143
139 See, e.g., John A. Tisdale, Deterred Nonapplicants in Title VII Class Actions: Examin-
ing the Limits of Equal Employment Opportunity, 64 B.U. L. REV. 151, 171 (1984) (“The
case signals an end to the procedural favoritism often granted Title VII plaintiffs by
the federal courts and effectively rejects the across-the-board concept of class
certification.”).
140 See, e.g., Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590, 596-98 (2d Cir. 1986).
141 Id. at 2552–53.
142 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
143 See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, 270
(1977); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268
(1939); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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This requirement that the plaintiff show intent to discriminate
may explain why in employment discrimination suits, much of the
class action litigation is now brought under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),144 rather than under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause using § 1983.  In cases involving group-wide harms, show-
ing intent to discriminate by an organization, not just against a
particular individual, but a class, may be prohibitively difficult absent
the ability to rely on a pattern or practice of behavior.  Title VII per-
mits reliance on such a showing of disparate treatment.  Indeed Con-
gress revised provisions concerning disparate treatment in response to
the decisions by the Court that made reliance on disparate impact
evidence more difficult under Title VII.145
In other contexts, the Court similarly acted to individualize
claims of race discrimination.  In the death penalty context, the Court
rejected in McCleskey v. Kemp an attempt to show race discrimination
in capital sentencing by relying on aggregate, statewide statistics.146
Thus, Judith Resnick points out that in Dukes, “[t]he Court does not
cite McCleskey v. Kemp . . . but the analytic approach is similar.”147
However, the Court admits that depending on the context, its rul-
ings alter the showing required under the Equal Protection Clause.
For example, the Court explained in Arlington Heights that “[b]ecause
of the nature of the jury-selection task, however, we have permitted a
finding of constitutional violation even when the statistical pattern
does not approach the extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion.”148  Of
course, the relief sought in a challenge to jury selection would typi-
cally be individual relief in a particular case.  A more generous
approach is also followed in voting rights cases, also relying on voting
rights statutes.  There the Court has held that discriminatory purpose
may be inferred from statistical evidence, even where not nearly as
144 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
145 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k); S. REP. NO. 101-315, at 6 (1990); Wards Cove Pack-
ing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 651–53 (1989) (holding that statistical evidence
in a hiring discrimination case must often include data regarding the pool of “quali-
fied applicants,” and that “[r]acial imbalance in one segment of an employer’s work
force does not, without more, establish a prima facie case of disparate impact with
respect to the selection of workers for the employer’s other positions, even where
workers for the different positions may have somewhat fungible skills”).
146 481 U.S. 279 (1987).  For the argument that McCleskey could have been
brought as civil class action, see Steven Graines & Justin Wyatt, The Rehnquist Court,
Legal Process Theory, and McCleskey v. Kemp, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2000).
147 Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-
Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 83 n.9 (2011).
148 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 n.13 (citing Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346,
359 (1970); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, 407 (1967)).
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“stark” as that rejected in cases such as McCleskey.149  In contrast, in
Title VII cases after Wal-Mart v. Dukes, more rigorous statistical evi-
dence may be required; certainly the Court emphasized that mere
anecdotal evidence and general regression evidence without further
analysis would not suffice at the class certification stage.150  For differ-
ent theories, then, the inquiry is either individualized or generalized,
affecting whether claims may be readily aggregated.
4. Criminal Procedure Claims
For constitutional criminal procedure claims, the Court has
added as part of the substantive definition of the right itself, require-
ments that one show prejudice, or that the outcome would have been
different had the state provided a fair trial.  Classic examples include
the Brady v. Maryland151 and Strickland v. Washington152 “materiality”
tests.  The “totality of the circumstances” test for voluntariness of con-
fessions requires a case-specific inquiry,153 as do the tests requiring a
showing that destruction or fabrication of evidence was in bad faith.154
I have previously explored how these individualized tests substantially
hinder aggregate treatment.  It is very difficult to bring a class action
regarding a pattern or practice of deprivations of procedural due pro-
cess rights, such as the right to effective assistance of counsel, or to be
free from a coerced confession or fabrication of evidence by law
enforcement.
For example, the Second Circuit ruled that where a class of
juveniles alleged a pattern of coercive interrogations violating their
Fifth Amendment rights, the proper remedy was “case-by-case” adjudi-
cation in hearings to suppress the confessions during their criminal
prosecutions or an individual civil rights suit, but not a class action.155
One reason cited was reluctance to interfere with the criminal pro-
149 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993); Richard H. Pildes & Richard
G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-Dis-
trict Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 506–07 (1993).  The Court
adopts the term “expressive harm” in Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 984 (1996) (“[W]e
also know that the nature of the expressive harms with which we are dealing, and the
complexity of the districting process, are such that bright-line rules are not
available.”).
150 Wal-mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557–58 (2011).
151 373 U.S. 83, 87–89 (1963).
152 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
153 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
154 See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) (requiring showing of bad
faith where potentially exculpatory evidence was destroyed by police); Napue v. Illi-
nois, 360 U.S. 264, 272 (1959) (rule against bad faith fabrication of evidence).
155 Deshawn E. by Charlotte E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 347 (2d Cir. 1998).
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cess, where the Court has held that federal courts should be highly
reluctant to enjoin pending prosecutions;156 but another was the indi-
vidualized constitutional right, “because the voluntariness of a confes-
sion depends upon an examination of the totality of circumstances in
each individual case.”157
Nevertheless, aggregation is possible in cases raising systemic con-
stitutional criminal procedure violations, as counterintuitive as that
may seem in our single-case focused criminal justice system.  I have
previously argued courts should be more open to aggregate resolution
of criminal procedure claims—perhaps before trial, before harmless
error, abuse of the writ and other procedural barriers would frustrate
litigation of systemic criminal procedure problems.158  Indeed, the
Supreme Court’s “emphasis on a formal individualized day in court
has ironically pushed lower courts to adopt aggregation as judicial
self-help.”159  While changes in the law of habeas corpus have made
federal courts a poor forum for such claims, they have used informal
methods of aggregation, state courts have been more receptive to
such suits, in part in reaction to crises in criminal defense and per-
ceived need to resolve systemic errors that have arisen, for example,
fraudulent forensic crime lab work.160
5. Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which states “pri-
vate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation[,]”161 implicates several types of government action as the
Supreme Court has interpreted its text, including regulations that
reduce the economic value of property, outright physical takings of
private property, and physical invasions of private property.162
Class actions involving “regulatory takings” are typically not feasi-
ble.  Why are leading takings cases, like Kelo v. City of New London,163
brought by individual property owners and not as class actions? As the
156 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 55 n.2 (1971).  The Court held that federal
courts must abstain from enjoining pending state prosecutions except in highly
extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 56.
157 Deshawn E.,156 F.3d at 347.
158 Brandon L. Garrett, supra note 18 at 403–04. R
159 Id. at 449.
160 Id. at Part II.  For a piece suggesting that to change this state of affairs, habeas
corpus statutes could be altered to facilitate systemic litigation, see Eve Brensike
Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010).
161 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
162 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005).
163 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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Federal Court of Claims explained in a case involving regulation of
cigarette vending machines, “takings cases are, by their nature, factu-
ally intensive.”164  The court must focus on individual-specific ques-
tions, and as the court stated, “In evaluating whether a governmental
action amounts to a taking or a mere diminution in property value
(which by itself does not constitute a taking), the Court must assess
the nature of the governmental action, the economic impact of the
regulation on each plaintiff, and the extent to which the challenged
regulation has interfered with each plaintiff’s distinct investment-
backed expectations.”165
The complexity of the Fifth Amendment analysis arises from the
Court’s multi-factor test in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City.166  After all, “whether a particular restriction will be rendered
invalid by the government’s failure to pay for any losses proximately
caused by it depends largely ‘upon the particular circumstances [in
that] case’” and described the inquiry as “essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries.”167  The Court of Claims had denied class certification,
explaining that “[t]he factual intensity of a regulatory takings claim,
then, pertains not only to the quantum of damages that each plaintiff
claims, but also to the very question of whether or not a particular
Government action has effected a compensable fifth amendment tak-
ing as to each plaintiff” and concluded that such complexities “in
both the liability and damages phases of a regulatory takings claim
renders inappropriate the large, multi-party case contemplated by the
plaintiffs.”168
Property owners may bring declaratory judgment action before
enforcement of a regulation, and in that way obtain a ruling on the
constitutionality of the rule without the need for such a class action.169
In cases involving seizures of property or permanent physical inva-
sions of property, property owners can individually challenge the
164 A-1 Cigarette Vending Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 643, 645 (Fed. Cl.
1998).
165 Id. at 645–46.
166 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
167 Id. at 124 (citing United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168
(1958)).
168 A-1 Cigarette, at 646; see also Neumont v. Monroe Cnty. Fla., 104 F. Supp .2d
1368, 1371 (S.D.Fla. 2000) (In a case involving a Florida statute banning vacation
rentals, the court stated, “In a partial takings situation, the Court must make an ad
hoc inquiry based upon the particular circumstances in each case to determine
whether a constitutional taking has occurred.”).
169 See, e.g., ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1286 (N.D. Okla.
2007) (pre-enforcement challenge to statute prohibiting property owners from ban-
ning storage of firearms in locked vehicles).
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planned action by seeking declaratory or injunctive relief before it
occurs.  Challenges after the fact regarding whether sufficient just
compensation was provided may be difficult to pursue as class actions,
because each must exhaust state remedies providing compensation;
the Court has held that such an action is not ripe until the party
“seek[s] compensation through the procedures the State has provided
for doing so,” unless no state process was provided or that process was
inadequate.170
Further, claims involving calculation of compensation for takings
will tend to involve the assessment of the value of the property inter-
est, which may vary considerably and involve questions of state law.
For example, in one putative class action, in Swisher v. United States,171
the district court denied class certification in a case concerning a con-
version of a railroad easement into a nature trial, stating that to pro-
ceed “the Court [would have to] review each deed or other
instrument, the governing state law at the time of the original convey-
ance and the facts and circumstances of the transaction . . . .  Plaintiff
has not shown that her deed, Kansas state law or the circumstances of
the conveyance of her land are typical of the claims of class
members.”172
In some unusual cases involving permanent physical invasions of
property, courts have held that the common questions are of suffi-
cient complexity so as to justify class treatment.  In Tommaseo v. United
States,173 a large group of homeowners in the Lower Ninth Ward of
New Orleans sued the Army Corps of Engineers on a theory of a “con-
tinuous physical process taking,” stating that the creation and mainte-
nance of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO) lead to ongoing
erosion and saltwater intrusion that resulted in damage after Hurri-
cane Katrina and continues to threaten their property.174  The court
noted, “Although the circumstances and extent of each Plaintiff’s
injury may vary, each relies on a common set of facts and the same
legal theory.”175
170 Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985); see also Neumont v. Monroe Cnty., Fla., 242 F. Supp. 2d
1265, 1288 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (dismissing takings claims in class action where plaintiffs
did not make a proper showing of exhaustion).
171 189 F.R.D. 638 (D. Kan. 1999).
172 Id. at 641.
173 80 Fed. Cl. 366 (Fed. Cl. 2008).
174 Id. at 374.
175 Id.
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Other constitutional rights may be amenable to similar analysis,
including the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.176  What
explains the inconsistencies observed, where even claims in the same
clause of the same Bill of Rights provision may be aggregated or indi-
vidualized, or both?  In some instances, the constitutional text may
explain the decision to individualize.  The individual litigation con-
text may also explain some of the individualized focus of many consti-
tutional claims.  In individual damages cases, the Court became
focused not with issues of systemic deterrence, but rather whether
individual claims should be affecting larger operations of government.
Similarly, regarding rights arising in criminal cases arising on appeal
post-conviction, the Court focused on individual questions in the con-
text of a whether a new trial should be granted.  In contrast, in set-
tings in which litigation was typically class litigation, such as in
employment discrimination, school desegregation, and prison condi-
tions suits, the Court examined the scope of remedies rather than
impose individualized tests, raising separate problems—but problems
focused on the nature of the aggregate remedy.177
Constitutional rules can be narrowed in multiple ways.  Bright-
line rules can narrow a constitutional right, since conduct on one side
of the line cannot be remedied.  Individualized or totality of the cir-
cumstances-type rules also narrow a constitutional right, since it may
be only egregious violations that, on balance, satisfy the test and
obtain a remedy.  It is the individualizing type of limit that has a far
greater impact on aggregate remedies.  Such individualization, how-
ever, also creates less certainty for officials and it makes rights more
diffuse.  The individual model for constitutional litigation should be
questioned, as aggregate litigation may be preferable in a host of areas
where rights as currently constructed resist class treatment.  Not only
may rights be individualized, but related remedial doctrine may be
individualized as well.  Next I turn to decisions regarding remedies
that may also hinder aggregate treatment.
176 Establishment Clause class actions include: Stott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d 134, 143
(4th Cir. 1990) (finding no class certification in employment First Amendment case,
where “in political patronage cases, the critical and dispositive question is whether a
particular position is one that requires, as a qualification for its performance, political
affiliation”); Forest Hills Early Learning Ctr., Inc. v. Lukhard, 789 F.2d 295, 295 (4th
Cir. 1986) (involving child care operators challenging the constitutionality of the stat-
utory exemption of religiously affiliated child care centers under the Establishment
Clause); Sherman ex rel. Sherman v. Twp. High Sch. Dist. 214, 540 F. Supp. 2d 985,
988 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (involving claim that Illinois “Silent Reflection and Student
Prayer Act” violated their rights under the Establishment Clause).
177 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974).
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B. Individualized Constitutional Remedies
Sub-constitutional rules, whether called constitutional common
law, or law of constitutional remedies, or decision rules,178 may also
individualize and create obstacles to relief that pose particular chal-
lenges for aggregate cases.179 For several constitutional claims, the
Court has individualized the right in its treatment of questions related
to the remedy, as distinguished from the underlying constitutional
right.  In contrast, the Court has expansively interpreted associational
standing, suggesting there is nothing inevitable about viewing consti-
tutional litigation through an individualized lens.
First, regarding damages remedies, for many constitutional
rights, showing that an individual suffered harm due to the rights vio-
lation alone may be difficult.  The Court has repeatedly ruled, how-
ever, that damages for the violation of the Constitution itself will not
be “presumed.”  Individualized showings as to damages may not bar
class action treatment, but they may militate against class action certi-
fication.  For example, in due process cases, for both civil and crimi-
nal procedure claims, courts require a highly individualized showing.
In civil rights due process cases, each plaintiff must show not just a
denial of process under some generally applicable procedure, but to
recover anything more than nominal damages, they must also show
that if proper procedure had been provided that the outcome would
have been in their favor.180
This impact is particularly felt in the area of welfare benefits.
Randal Jeffrey has asked why class actions are so difficult to bring,
where hundreds of thousands of people receive welfare benefits in
some states, and where improper denial of benefits as a matter of
practice or negligence can be routine.181  Class actions could make
correcting erroneous denials on a systemic basis far more efficient.
178 Michell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004).
179 On the connection between remedial law, substantive rights, and aggregation
more generally, see AM. LAW INST., supra note 15, at § 2.03–04 (noting also the dis- R
tinction between indivisible and divisible remedies).
180 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 248 (1978); see also Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist.
v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986) (“[T]he abstract value of a constitutional right
may not form the basis for § 1983 damages.”).
181 See Randal S. Jeffrey, Facilitating Welfare Rights Class Action Litigation: Putting
Damages and Attorney’s Fees to Work, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 281, 281–84 (2003).  Jeffrey
states that “even one instance of discontinuing food stamps without notice violates the
law” yet few class actions are brought. Id. at 292.  “Given that tort damages generally
facilitate contingency fee arrangements, and welfare rights plaintiffs have access to
tort damages, the question becomes why nonprofit and private attorneys pursue so
few welfare rights cases.” Id. at 298.  Contempt damages may in contrast be obtained
for noncompliance with prospective welfare rights injunction. See Alexander v. Hill,
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To recoup prior benefits, however, could run afoul of sovereign
immunity limits if the welfare agency is a state entity.182  In addition,
challenging ongoing denials would require litigation of whether they
in fact were entitled to their welfare benefits, which may typically
require live testimony from welfare administrators, who often retain
broad statutory discretion, and testimony and documentation from
the recipients’ witnesses.
Other procedural rulings may discourage civil rights attorneys
from bringing class actions.  Civil rights attorneys may receive fees
even in a class action obtaining only nominal damages,183 but they will
not necessarily receive significant statutory fees if the case settles.184
Further, a contingency fee, the typical means for compensation in
mass tort actions, has little significance even in a case involving hun-
dreds of thousands of persons receiving a nominal one dollar
recovery.185
In cases not seeking damages, but rather an injunction, civil
rights class actions face other challenges.  As noted, Rule 23(b)(2), is
the provision that the drafters of modern Rule 23 had in mind as a
vehicle for injunctive relief-seeking civil rights class actions.  In such
class actions, as Samuel Issacharoff writes, giving a school desegrega-
tion case as an example, “[w]hile each aggrieved child is deemed to
have standing to bring a claim for wrongful deprivation of a claimed
right to integrated schools, no child has an individual stake in the
outcome of that litigation separate from that of the other similarly
situated children.”186
Despite the group-based nature of injunctive relief class actions,
the Supreme Court adopted important limitations on actions seeking
injunctive relief in Los Angeles v. Lyons that made the characteristics of
707 F.2d 780, 783 (4th Cir. 1983); Rodriguez v. Swank, 496 F.2d 1110, 1113 (7th Cir.
1974).
182 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663–64 (1974).
183 See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 (1992) (holding that nominal damages
are sufficient for plaintiffs to receive prevailing party status, entitling the plaintiff’s
attorney to statutory fees).
184 See Cummings v. Connell, 402 F.3d 936, 946 (9th Cir. 2005).
185 In addition, it may be difficult to recover damages where sovereign immunity
can bar recovery against the State, or even some counties considered as arms of the
state under state law. See, e.g., Baxter v. Vigo Cnty. Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 738 (7th
Cir. 1994); Keller v. Prince George’s Cnty., 923 F.2d 30, 32 (4th Cir. 1991).  Congress
also restricted federal funded Legal Services Corporation lawyers from litigating class
actions. See Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(d)(5) (2006); David
Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 91
CALIF. L. REV. 209, 220–26 (2003).
186 Issacharoff, supra note 72, at 1059. R
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the named plaintiff highly consequential.187  That decision has been
much criticized for its interpretation of Article III standing as linked
with the “irreparable injury” requirement for obtaining an injunction,
and in addition, for the Court’s strained interpretation of the facts in
the case.  However, that opinion should also be understood as
reshaping the nature of aggregate civil rights litigation.  The Court
ruled that plaintiffs must sufficiently allege an individual likelihood of
harm in the future, pursuant to a policy or pattern of government
behavior, to obtain standing to pursue injunctive relief.188  The Lyons
decision had a unique impact on cases seeking to enjoin police
departments, because the Court ruled that it would not presume that
plaintiffs would be likely to break the law and then encounter police
in the future.189  The Court also emphasized restraint in issuing
injunctions against law enforcement, for reasons of comity, federalism
and deference.190
Rather than focus on the question whether the state has adopted
an unconstitutional practice that would be remedied by class-wide
injunctive relief, the Court required a showing that a particular indi-
vidual plaintiff is likely to be harmed again.191  This inquiry must be
conducted for individual named plaintiffs in a class action.  The Court
has held “[t]hat a suit may be a class action . . . adds nothing to the
question of standing,” where plaintiffs “must allege and show that they
personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by
other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and
which they purport to represent.”192 Even if it is highly certain that
members of a class will be harmed in the future, the Court will not
187 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–06 (1983).
188 Id. at 111–13.
189 Id. at 106–07; see Brandon Garrett, Note, Standing While Black: Distinguishing
Lyons in Racial Profiling Cases, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1815, 1817–19 (2000).
190 See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 112 (urging “restraint in the issuance of injunctions
against state officers engaged in the administration of the States’ criminal laws”); see
also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976) (suggesting that principles of federalism
have applicability where injunctive relief is requested against state and local executive
branches); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499–500 (1974) (denying relief on ripe-
ness grounds, but stating that monitoring state courts would violate principles of
federalism).
191 Hodgers-Durgin v. De la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(denying class certification to motorists claiming profiling in immigration enforce-
ment and noting “system-wide injunctive relief is not available based on alleged inju-
ries to unnamed members of a proposed class”).
192 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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take action if the particular named plaintiff’s future injury is unduly
“speculative.”
Regarding the rights previously described, such as Fourth
Amendment claims, in which the Court has individualized the inquiry,
Lyons poses an obstacle.  Plaintiffs may distinguish Lyons in a range of
situations in which they can show that they and other class members
are likely to be harmed again.193  For example, judges have found that
the Lyons test is satisfied for claims in which the harm is defined in the
aggregate, such as for equal protection violations in which it is alleged
that a policy of discrimination affected the entire class in the same way
and in an ongoing manner.  Those rulings do not, however, consider
it relevant that the case is brought as a class action.194
The proper inquiry would focus on whether the class possesses a
live case or controversy, that is, whether an ongoing constitutional vio-
lation predictably threatens members of the class.  If the potential
harm is severe enough, an injunction may be justified even if the risk
to any particular single person is small.  The notion that a single class
plaintiff must show a particular degree of personal threat of future
injury flies in the face of the purposes of Rule 23(b)(2).  The 23(b)(2)
class action involves a group entitled to injunctive relief precisely
because identities of individual class members are not relevant to the
merits of the underlying remedy that is sought.  Further, such a rule is
inconsistent with the equitable discretion of the judge, which does
permit judges even in individual cases to extend injunctive relief to a
class (though the scope of the injunction may be tailored more nar-
rowly, as discussed).
Such an approach would not permit the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to substitute for Article III standing requirements.  It is not
clear what daylight there is between that requirement and the Rule 23
requirement that the injunctive relief be appropriate because the
opposing party has acted “on grounds that apply generally to the
class.”195  The separate requirement of Lyons that an individual plain-
tiff show likelihood of future harm to obtain an injunction arguably
has little to do with Article III standing.  It has more to do with
whether an injunction should in fact be granted on the merits in the
court’s equitable discretion.  The Court recognized that the require-
ments “obviously shade” together.196
193 See Garrett, supra note 18, at II.A. R
194 See id.
195 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
196 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 103 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974)).
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Today, the Court might make clear that Lyons is in fact a pleading
requirement, asking that a plaintiff be specific about the need for an
injunction. Wal-Mart represented a real change in course for the
Court; its earlier decision in Eisen had included dicta suggesting that
the merits could not be examined at the class certification stage.  The
Wal-Mart Court rejected any such suggestion as “mistaken,” and
instead explicitly held that class certification can demand preliminary
examination of the merits.197  Indeed, the dissent did not disagree
with the notion that there may need to be “rigorous analysis” of the
merits at the class certification stage, even an analysis of expert
evidence.198
Such analysis would proceed differently than the Lyons analysis.
After all, the public interest is relevant to a preliminary injunction
analysis and an injunctive relief analysis.  The presence of a group of
similarly situated class of people should impact that piece of the mer-
its analysis; a class of the public is seeking relief.
Further, courts recognize that once a class action is certified,
“statutory and Article III standing requirements must be assessed with
reference to the class as a whole, not simply with reference to the
individual named plaintiffs.”199  The Seventh Circuit explained, in
approving certification of a class involving all nineteen Illinois coun-
ties, though named plaintiffs were in four counties, that “there are
cases where appropriate relief may only be obtained through one
broad suit, and it will be impossible to find a named plaintiff to match
each defendant.”200  The Supreme Court recognized as much in its
decision in United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty,201 holding that
though the claims of the named plaintiff were moot and the district
court had denied class certification, the plaintiff could represent the
class on appeal, which the Court granted,202 and similarly in Deposit
Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, permitting class certification even
197 Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2542, 2552 n.6 (2011) (calling the suggestion
that based on Eisen, the merits could not be examined “mistaken” and the “purest
dictum” and calling a preliminary examination of the merits a “necessity” in some
class actions (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U. S. 156, 177 (1974))).
198 Id. at 2551. There are difficult questions, however, that the Court did not
answer regarding what the standard now is for adequately showing that the suit has
merit to be certified. See Susanna Sherry, Hogs Get Slaughtered at the Supreme Court,
2011 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 29 (2011) (noting troubling “ambiguity” where the Court
demands “rigorous analysis” and “convincing proof” but not “actual proof of the mer-
its of the case”).
199 Payton v. Cnty. of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 2002).
200 Id. at 681.
201 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
202 See id. at 404.
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though the defendants had offered to settle with the individual
named plaintiffs.203
There is a tension between Geraghty and Lyons.204  Jonathan
Macey and Geoffrey Miller have argued that where the plaintiff class
has a live controversy the fact that named plaintiffs may lack a per-
sonal stake is “hardly relevant as a realistic or functional matter”
where the cases are “controlled by plaintiffs’ attorneys throughout.”205
They provocatively argued that so long as some class members have a
sufficiently concrete stake, “it should not be necessary to demand a
representative plaintiff who fulfills traditional Article III requirements
for injury in fact and a stake in the outcome.”206  Class actions could
be treated differently.
One more modest way to reinvigorate the role aggregate litiga-
tion plays in constitutional cases would be to undo Lyons in this
respect—withdraw the sub-constitutional statement by the Court that
the class action status of a suit “adds nothing to the question of stand-
ing.”207  The presence of a class of individuals should sometimes add
to the question whether an injunction is appropriate.  The Court’s
ruling in Lyons viewed the underlying Fourth Amendment claim as
highly individualized, and perhaps even if such a case goes forward,
that might make an injunction more difficult to tailor.208  Even when
plaintiffs seek injunctive relief in a classic 23(b)(2) civil rights action,
the definition of the underlying substantive right affects whether a
remedy may be obtained, even when it is a class that seeks relief.  How-
ever, postponing addressing the question of standing until class certi-
fication, and treating class certification as very much adding
203 See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332–33 (1980).
204 There is also tension with the Court’s statement in Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625–26 (1997), that “[A] class representative must be part of
the class and ‘possess the same interest and suffer the same injury’ as the class mem-
bers.”  (quoting E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403
(1977)).
205 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 82 (1991).
206 Id. at 83.  They also proposed that a “Jane Doe” or “Richard Roe” complaint
seeking class certification could satisfy Article III justiciability requirements, disposing
of the requirement that “there be any named plaintiff at all.” Id. at 83–84.
207 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976)).
208 James Keenley, How Many Injuries Does it Take?  Article III Standing in the Class
Action Context, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 849, 883–84 (2007) (criticizing application of Lyons in
defendant class actions).
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something to the question of standing, would both simplify the analy-
sis and permit a more careful merits consideration.
C. Associational and Organizational Standing
Another way to allow groups to participate in constitutional chal-
lenges is to allow groups to themselves sue on behalf of their mem-
bers.  There is a great deal of tension between the Court’s treatment
of associations and with class actions.  The Court has viewed associa-
tional standing expansively, for example in NAACP v. Alabama,209
where the organization asserted the right of members to remain anon-
ymous.210  The Court’s test for associational standing focuses on
whether the relief sought would reasonably benefit the members of
the organization, and whether one or more members would individu-
ally have standing to sue themselves—and where there are not issues
of “individualized proof,” permitting the claims to be “properly
resolved in a group context.”211  In doing so, the Court adopts a test
somewhat like that used to decide whether to certify a class action—
but far more relaxed, including because the test permits the case to go
forward even if not all members of the association would have stand-
ing to sue.
The Court has rejected the argument that groups must use the
class action device and satisfy the requirements of Rule 23.  The Court
held in UAW v. Brock212 that despite the lack of procedural restrictions
for associational suits, as opposed to class actions, it can be preferable
to have an entity sue: “an association suing to vindicate the interests of
its members can draw upon a pre-existing reservoir of expertise and
capital.”213 The Court added that, “The very forces that cause individ-
uals to band together in an association will thus provide some guaran-
tee that the association will work to promote their interests.”214  Such
209 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
210 See id. at 459 (“To require that it be claimed by the members themselves would
result in nullification of the right at the very moment of its assertion.”).
211 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343–44 (1977)
(describing three part test for associational standing, where: “(a) its members would
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect
are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the
relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit”).  For
a recent case denying associational standing premised on statistical evidence that
members would be harmed, citing to the need to show that at least one member
would have standing, see Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 498 (2009).
212 477 U.S. 274 (1986).
213 Id. at 289.
214 Id. at 290.
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a representative suit does not bind non-members, and the Court
noted that if there was a lack of adequacy of representation, the ruling
might not preclude subsequent suits by members.215
The same justifications—expertise, capital, and efficiency—sup-
port use of class actions.  Nor is the Court overly concerned with what
kind of organization it is; the organization need not even be a tradi-
tional membership organization, and may sue if it “for all practical
purposes” serves the interests of others.216  And in contrast, when an
organization sues to assert its own interests, distinct from those of its
members, the inquiry is whether the entity itself suffered a concrete
injury to its own interests, apart from any injury to its members.217
Such rulings suggest that where the class action device itself cre-
ates a group litigation entity, with the additional procedural rigor of a
class action, the standing requirements should similarly be relaxed so
long as the group itself seeks a common benefit.218  Further, associa-
tions formed to protect constitutional rights of their members can
themselves litigate constitutional claims, perhaps more readily than
plaintiffs joining together in a class action, as can organizations them-
selves if they can show a drain on their resources or some other con-
crete injury.  The Court’s associational and organizational cases
provide important tools that can encourage group constitutional liti-
gation—but they will be useful tools only if the underlying rights are
amenable to aggregate treatment and do not involve too many indi-
vidualized issues.
D. Aggregation Under Civil Rights Statutes
Perhaps procedural obstacles to the aggregate resolution of civil
rights claims under § 1983 explain why much of civil rights class
action litigation is brought under more modern civil rights statutes
215 Id.; see also United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown
Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 556–57 & n.6 (1996).
216 Hunt, 423 U.S. at 344; see also Karl S. Coplan, Is Voting Necessary? Organization
Standing and Non-Voting Members of Environmental Advocacy Organizations, 14 SE. ENVTL.
L.J. 47, 75 (2005) (describing inconsistent caselaw concerning the functional mem-
bership test set out in Hunt).
217 See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738–40 (1972); see also Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 n.19 (1982) (“We have previously recognized
that organizations are entitled to sue on their own behalf for injuries they have sus-
tained.”).  For a case distinguishing Lyons and citing to organizational standing, see
Md. State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Md. Dep’t of State Police, 72 F. Supp. 2d
560, 565 (D. Md. 1999).
218 See Heidi Li Feldman, Note, Divided We Fall: Associational Standing and Collective
Interest, 87 MICH. L. REV. 733, 744 (1988) (advocating theory of “collective standing”).
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enacted by Congress and not direct constitutional claims.  Congress
cannot undo decisions by the Court to individualize standards defin-
ing constitutional rights.  However, Congress can set out expansive
standards for remedies, procedures that facilitate aggregate litigation,
and can define the substance of civil rights violations more broadly
than constitutional rights.
Thus, while the Equal Protection Clause may not be amenable to
certain types of aggregate employment discrimination, as noted,
much employment discrimination litigation is brought under Title
VII.  The Court in Falcon emphasized that nothing in Title VII indi-
cated “that Congress intended to authorize such a wholesale expan-
sion of class-action litigation.”219  The impact of that decision was that
“[b]y 1991, due in large part to the Supreme Court’s decision in Fal-
con, the class action device was seldom used in addressing claims of
employment discrimination.”220  This changed with revisions enacted
to Title VII in 1991, which included making compensatory and puni-
tive damages available.  The statement of purpose said nothing about
class actions.221  However, the amendments encouraged plaintiffs to
now seek damages and file 23(b)(3) class actions, or try to find a way
to include compensation within a 23(b)(2) action.222  Unlike § 1983,
Title VII permits reliance on aggregate evidence of a disparate impact
on employees, which may be particularly attractive in cases in which it
is particularly difficult to show that the employer acted with a discrimi-
natory motive.223  The Wal-Mart decision will impact class action prac-
tice under Title VII.  But Congress may intervene again, perhaps
219 Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 (1982).
220 Scotty Shively, Resurgence of the Class Action Lawsuit in Employment Discrimination
Cases: New Obstacles Presented by the 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act, 23 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 925, 935–36 (2001) (“It was no longer sufficient for one plaintiff,
represented by one law firm, to allege across-the-board discrimination.”).
221 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991)
(describing general purposes of the amendments, including “to respond to recent
decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights stat-
utes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination”).  There
were few references to class actions in the legislative history, and none regarding facil-
itating aggregate litigation. See 137 CONG. REC. H9505-01, H9530 (daily ed. Nov. 7,
1991).
222 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006).
223 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (“An unlawful employment practice
based on disparate impact is established under this subchapter only if—a com-
plaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice
that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity . . . .”); see
also GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 79–82 (2001).
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regarding the promotions standards at issue in the case (which itself
may explain in part the Court’s emphasis on a need to show common
practices across different Wal-Mart stores and divisions.)  Similarly,
disparate impact claims may be brought under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act (ADEA).224
Congress may alternatively prefer individualization of rights.  For
example, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) has a different
structure than Title VII, focusing on whether employers provide “rea-
sonable accommodations” to employees, requiring in turn an individ-
ualized assessment of the extent of disability, or indeed a medical
assessment whether members of the class in fact satisfy the statutory
criteria for disability.225  As a result, the “class action device has been
virtually nonexistent in disability discrimination employment
cases.”226  In contrast, ADA suits regarding public accommodations,
which lack such an inquiry and which typically involve 23(b)(2)
actions requesting injunctive relief that would benefit all class mem-
bers, have been commonly resolved as class actions.227
Congress may also intervene to pass statutes that limit the ability
to bring aggregate constitutional and not just statutory claims.  Con-
gress significantly limited availability of injunctive relief in suits
regarding prison conditions.228  The Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA) provides that “[p]rospective relief in any civil action with
respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to
correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or
plaintiffs.”229  The PLRA prohibits approval of a consent decree that
does not comply with that limitation.230
Congress took a very different approach towards the problem of
Lyons and the difficulty of bringing Fourth Amendment excessive
force or search and seizure class actions.  In 1994, Congress enacted a
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 14141,231 providing the Department of Justice with
224 See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005).
225 See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 478 (1999); Michael Ashley
Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Impact, and Class Actions, 56 DUKE
L.J. 861, 867 (2006).
226 Stein & Waterstone, supra note 225, at 861; see id. at 883–84 & n. 95. R
227 See, e.g., Colo. Cross-Disability Coal. v. Taco Bell Corp., 184 F.R.D. 354, 357–63
(D. Colo. 1999); Neff v. VIA Metro. Transit Auth., 179 F.R.D. 185, 191 (W.D. Tex.
1998).
228 Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 504(a)(7), 110
Stat. 1321-66 (1996) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3626 (2006)).
229 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1) (2006).
230 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(1) & (2)(B) (2006).
231 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2006).
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authority to secure injunctive relief to remedy violations; prosecutors
can pursue broad systemic remedies that private plaintiffs cannot.232
III. IN DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AGGREGATION
What the Court gives or takes, Congress may alter to privilege or
prohibit aggregation.  That is for the best.  A theory of democratic
accountability and class actions would support judicial caution in indi-
vidualizing constitutional rights, but less caution in interpreting stat-
utes and remedial law which can be more easily altered by Congress.
Normative theories for class action litigation have focused chiefly on
efficiency gains from aggregation, but not on the civil rights context
and their relationship with constitutional litigation.  This Part
describes how aggregate litigation can sometimes better accomplish
the goals of a civil rights system than piecemeal individual litigation,
and how constitutional interpretation should be conducted with a
consciousness of its effects upon the structure of litigation.
A. Advantages of Group Constitutional Litigation
Whether the right permits aggregate proof greatly affects the
quality of the right and remedy.  Class actions can provide a far more
efficient means to resolve litigation than in individual litigation.  Indi-
vidual litigation typically focuses on compensatory damages and not
on remedying systemic problems of public interest.  That is not to say
that individual litigants may not bring important constitutional chal-
lenges that can have broadly significant effects.  However, individual
litigants will also have a harder time bringing significant cases if con-
stitutional rights are interpreted in an individualized manner.  Their
cases will be viewed as applying to particular circumstances and not
raising larger issues.  Indeed, individualized rights make both individ-
ual and aggregate litigation more idiosyncratic.  As a result, the state
may face inconsistent rulings and unpredictable litigation.  The judi-
cial system faces piecemeal litigation and inefficient litigation of simi-
lar facts and legal claims.
Assuming that a right is defined in a way that it applies outside
particular individualized circumstances, aggregate litigation may pro-
vide a better forum to develop the meaning of that right.  By bringing
together all interested parties, class actions may provide greater qual-
ity of constitutional decision making in several respects.  As described,
there may be better access to information, including about larger pat-
232 For an analysis of litigation under that statute and proposals to improve its
effectiveness, see generally, for example, Rachel Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights
Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN L. REV. 1 (2009).
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terns of conduct.  Participation is broader.  Class actions may attract
better-qualified counsel with greater resources.  Repeat player civil
rights groups may be better able to focus resources on deserving cases.
Efficiency is generally facilitated by aggregate resolution of related
cases and claims.
Aggregate litigants may select different types of claims and more
systemic remedies.  Class actions may increase the deterrent effect of a
given case, although civil rights litigation currently invites substantial
individual litigation in state and federal courts.  Class actions may be
beneficial to government, because they avoid unpredictable and bur-
densome cost of repeat individual litigation.  The Supreme Court has
often noted how lawsuits directed at individual government officials
pose special burdens.  To the extent that class actions tend to focus
more on policymakers and on systemic remedies, rather than the facts
of particular encounters with officials, class actions may prove far less
intrusive.
On the other hand, class actions empower the attorneys, who
themselves may select representative plaintiffs and generally drive the
litigation.  Class action attorneys may on balance be far less self-inter-
ested than individual litigants.233 The due process dangers that class
actions pose—of inadequate or self-interested class representation,
conflicts, and collusion—may be reduced, though to be sure they are
not avoidable, in civil rights cases.  Civil rights class actions tend to
involve injunctive relief and comparatively smaller damages classes.234
Of course, large-scale class actions like the remarkable Wal-Mart class
action pose precisely the question whether the incentives of counsel
to receive massive fees makes their stake very different than the liti-
gants; that case, of course, was, as the Court found, not primarily
about an injunction.  The tradeoffs between compensation and
desired injunctive relief may pose some dilemmas for counsel,235
heightened where the Supreme Court ruled in Evans v. Jeff D.,236 that
plaintiff class attorneys could be required to waive fees as a condition
233 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do The “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judi-
cial Systems?: Repeat Players In ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 28 (1999) (“Class
actions and aggregations of claimants can make some one-shotters more like repeat
players, as can organizational client groups and organizational litigation strategies
(like those of the NAACP, Inc. Fund) . . . .”).
234 See Judith Resnik, From “Cases” To “Litigation,” 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no.
3, 1991, at 5, 66.
235 Ingles v. City of New York, 2003 WL 402565 *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[D]efendants
contend that plaintiffs have an incentive to settle on terms favor[ing] their damages
claims over class-wide institutional claims. This argument is rejected . . . .” (alteration
in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
236 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
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of settlement.237  In practice, however, retainer agreements may head
off such problems by commonly requiring hourly payment if no fees
are recovered or a contingency fee.238  Conflicts are greatly reduced
in cases that primarily seek injunctive relief.  After all, not only is there
the more limited compensation in such cases through civil rights fee
shifting statutes, but injunctions by their nature, as noted, permit
modification over time and may already be amenable to considering
whether conflicting or changing interests, or the public interest, coun-
sel change to the injunction.
A related concern would be that permitted additional aggregate
litigation would chill constitutional development, because recognition
of new rights would lead to a flood of class action litigation and mass
damages awards.239  To the extent the concern remains with over-
deterrence through excessive damages, qualified immunity already
permits a defense to damages awards.240  Qualified immunity issues
may justify separate proceedings concerning damages in certain types
of class actions.  Resolving injunctive relief questions separately, how-
ever, may provide great savings.  The Court often expresses a concern
with over-deterrence—however, class actions to secure aggregate
injunctive relief could provide the government with guidance on com-
pliance with the Constitution, while constitutional violations would
result in individual compensation only when an individual can prove a
serious violation.
B. Connecting Constitutional Substance with Procedure
The Court continually reinterprets constitutional rights, often
quite explicitly considering the effects of a particular interpretation
on future litigation, procedural posture of cases, deterrence, comity,
and other policy concerns.  Among those concerns, the advent of the
modern Rule 23 should be understood to have changed the backdrop
237 Id. at 730–32.
238 See Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990’s: The Dichotomy Between
Reality and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197, 215–16 (1997).
239 See Jeffries, supra note 17, at 100–02 (“Brown v. Board of Education was one of R
three companion cases seeking injunctive relief . . . . At the time, § 1983 damage
actions had not yet been rediscovered, nor had the modern class action evolved to
permit ‘mass tort’ litigation. . . . Of course, assessing how strict damages liability would
have changed Brown is ultimately a matter of conjecture, but it seems likely that the
prospect of money damages would have had some impact and that it would not have
been good.”).
240 See David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and
Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1206–13 (2005) (describing a series of
doctrines that limit relief to egregious constitutional violations).
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against which constitutional interpretation occurs.  Considering the
class action device or not, the Court has in some areas, undermined
the purposes of Rule 23.  As Richard Nagareda has argued, “The
affording or withholding of aggregate treatment is most problematic
from an institutional standpoint when it operates as a backdoor vehi-
cle to restructure the remedial scheme in applicable substantive
law.”241  Perhaps still more problematic is when substantive law is
interpreted in a manner that unthinkingly restricts the affording of
aggregate remedies.
One way to approach the problem of aggregation and constitu-
tional rights would be for courts to recognize that certain sub-constitu-
tional standards are designed to limit exposure of government in
individual and not group cases.  For example, § 1983 litigation is con-
stricted by a series of non-constitutional rules that the Supreme Court
has adopted in its interpretation of the purposes of the § 1983 statute
itself, including immunity doctrines.  The quasi-constitutional stand-
ing doctrine of Lyons also, as discussed above, limits injunctive relief.
Each of those rules could be altered in class action cases.  The pres-
ence of a class of affected individuals should alter the standing analy-
sis under Lyons. Further, as to particular constitutional rights and
remedial law questions of qualified immunity, the issues could be sep-
arated and considered apart from the class-wide issues deserving the
court’s attention.242
Similarly, constitutional rights could be viewed as possessing
aggregate and individual components.  Even as to a constitutional
right that contains an individualized test, the court could handle com-
mon issues separately and leave the remainder for mini-trials or indi-
vidual litigation. Indeed, post-Wal-Mart the Seventh Circuit did just
that, certifying a class action as to particular issues in an employment
discrimination case.243  In a constitutional case, a court could, say,
review whether a search and seizure policy employs improper criteria
and render rulings concerning injunctive relief, but leave for individ-
ual litigation questions whether officers had “reasonable suspicion” in
particular encounters or whether qualified immunity protects particu-
lar officers from damages judgments.
Another way to conceive of the problem is whether the right
should be remedied “upstream” or “downstream” from the conduct
241 Nagareda, supra note 39, at 1877–78. R
242 In some cases, qualified immunity may be amenable to class-wide adjudication.
See, e.g., Brown v. Kelly, 244 F.R.D. 222, 232 n. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
243 McReynolds v. Merrilll Lynch & Co., 2012 WL 3932328 *14 (7th Cir. Sept. 11,
2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-2\NDL202.txt unknown Seq: 53 28-JAN-13 14:27
2012] aggregation  and  constitutional  rights 645
towards the individual issues that come up as the conduct affects vic-
tims.244  Preventing conduct that affects large numbers of people at
the source, by changing policies and common conduct, may better
resolve problems than conceiving the right as arising only later once
intractable questions of individual harm and causation arise.
C. Democratic Participation and Aggregate Litigation
Aggregate resolution of core constitutional rights resonates with
the purposes of many of those provisions.  When judges interpret con-
stitutional tests in an individualized manner, they produce a particu-
larized tort regime, but not a regime that effectively defines
constitutional values.  The Court has noted: “aggregation of individual
claims . . . is an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries
unremedied by the regulatory action of the government.”245  Plaintiffs
in civil rights cases assert a different and more troubling type of injury,
in which the government itself caused injuries that might otherwise go
unremedied.
Constitutional theorists have long observed that the Court aggre-
gates the government interest in various tests and balances that gov-
ernment interest against that of the plaintiff, even if it is an individual
plaintiff bringing the suit.  The Mathews v. Eldridge246 due process test
is a classic example.247  Constitutional balancing tests balance the indi-
vidual’s liberty interest against “compelling” interests, national secur-
ity interests, law enforcement interests, or other aggregate interests of
government.248
Aggregation could help to define communities of interest, ensure
that interest representation in the political process, and promote
democratic participation.  A political process theory of constitutional
244 See Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 831–32
(1997).
245 See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
246 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
247 Id. at 335 (“[D]ue process generally requires consideration of three distinct
factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.” (citation omitted)).
248 See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943, 945 (1987); David L. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Govern-
ment Interests: Madisonian Principles Versus Supreme Court Practice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1521,
1523–24 (1992); Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 918 (1988).
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litigation is consonant not just with a theory of judicial review, but also
procedure, and in particular aggregate litigation.249  Class action theo-
rists have long argued that class actions create a form of governance
through litigation.250  In doing so, certification of a class establishes
an entity with common interest in the interpretation and remediation
of their constitutional rights.251  This entity is represented by lawyers
and not elected officials.  In cases in which the lawyers may be moti-
vated by economic interests in conflict with those of the class, the fact
that lawyers call this entity into existence can be problematic.  In civil
rights class actions, those features have always been far less problem-
atic.  After all, civil rights class actions may provide representation to
minorities whose rights have been neglected by the majority.  On a
theory that constitutional rights should first and foremost protect
those left out by the political process, using aggregation to assemble
the group, rather than leave individuals to solitary remedies, makes
far more sense.  Aggregate remedies may also support perceptions of
legitimacy in that process.252
A view of judicial minimalism favors judges crafting tailored stan-
dards that are context specific.253 Aggregate litigation is consistent
with at least some views of judicial minimalism.  Courts can incre-
mentally adjust standards defining rights and define those rights with-
out respect to individual acts but rather patterns and aggregate proof.
The Supreme Court has done so by adjusting over time systemic reme-
dies available to plaintiffs in school desegregation, voting rights, and
prison suits.
The Court’s definition of constitutional rights to recognize group
harm in equal protection cases but not as to other rights may be
explained by such a political process theory.  As Daryl Levinson wrote,
“we might simply recognize that group aggregation most often
emerges as a possibility in legal regimes concerned with equal treat-
ment of socially salient groups such as racial minorities and
women.”254  Levinson adds that, “As for group aggregation, nothing
internal to a general model of constitutional rights as prohibitions on
249 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 181–83 (1980).
250 See Issacharoff, supra note 72, at 1058. R
251 David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 913, 917–18 (1998) (“[T]he notion of class as entity should prevail over more
individually oriented notions of aggregate litigation.”).
252 See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 57–59 (1988); TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW 49–57 (2002).
253 CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME 61–72 (1999).
254 Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 1311,
1330 (2002).
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transactional harm dictates the choice between individual-level and
group-level analysis,” yet “the default assumption in most areas of con-
stitutional law seems to be that harms and benefits must be calculated
at the level of the individual.”255  That default assumption is flawed.  A
wide range of constitutional rights can implicate systemic practices.
They might be far better remedied using injunctions than through
sporadic individual damages awards.
To be sure, aggregation can have real costs.  In some cases, as
noted, aggregation may raise concerns regarding conflicts or ade-
quacy of representation.  However, the class action rules provide pro-
tections, which courts have not been shy about policing.  Those
concerns regarding the procedural fairness of class actions are
reduced in civil rights litigation, as opposed to mass tort or other civil
litigation in which financial interests between counsel and the class
may far more greatly diverge.  Vulnerable minority groups may feel a
lack of adequate political representation particularly acutely, and
aggregate litigation may provide superior access to adequate legal
representation.
CONCLUSION
Group litigation is integral to modern civil rights law.  In turn,
the modern Rule 23, and Rule 23(b)(2) in particular, was drafted with
civil rights class actions in mind.  Core constitutional rights were then
defined and redefined by the Supreme Court during the period that
followed, when aggregate civil litigation rose in importance.  In a
range of contexts, the Court individualized constitutional rights, per-
haps because the text called for an individual inquiry, but also to
avoid bright-line rules and prevent over-deterring or unduly burden-
ing government.  Still other rulings facilitate aggregate litigation.  As
described, plaintiffs may aggregate equal protection claims in voting
cases, while in policing cases, the Court generally requires plaintiffs to
satisfy highly individualized requirements that frustrate aggregate liti-
gation.  Meanwhile, the Court permits associations to broadly assert
constitutional rights of members.
Inconsistency in the Court’s approach to constitutional interpre-
tation is nothing new, nor is it necessarily problematic.  Pluralism in
constitutional theory may be here to stay with a constitutional Court
staffed by a cast of Justices sharing a diversity of approaches to consti-
tutional theory, and interpreting constitutional text and amendments
with varying substance, detail, and clarity.  However, when ruling on
255 Id. at 1374.
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the meaning of constitutional rights, the Court does not often explic-
itly consider the procedural mechanisms that drive constitutional liti-
gation.  In turn, the Court often interprets sub-constitutional or
statutory rules regarding standing, immunity, or remedies in a way
that emphasizes context-specific outcomes.  Such doctrines can be
altered by Congress—which is for the best.  Rulings individualizing
constitutional rights, in contrast, may not be readily undone through
the political process absent constitutional amendment.  In several
contexts, Congress intervened where the Court individualized rights
to provide administrative or statutory private enforcement.  However,
the Court has itself often responded to narrow aggregate remedies
under some of those statutes.
An understanding of the procedural potential of the class action
device should alter our view of a series of interpretations of constitu-
tional rights.  Class action scholarship has begun to explore the nor-
mative goals of aggregate resolution, looking beyond efficiency
rationales for class actions towards the implications of class action for
political theory and collective justice.256  The role that class actions
play in civil rights cases justifies a deeper look at the potential for com-
plex civil rights litigation to alter the ways constitutional rights are vin-
dicated—as well as the ways that constitutional rights are interpreted.
The Court considers the scale of constitutional rights, but not the
scale of constitutional litigation, except in the context of associational
standing, where the Court favors group litigation for sensible reasons.
Individuals may also be better served in the aggregate in other situa-
tions, and so may government and underlying constitutional values.
Whether the Court and Congress will rethink the individualized struc-
ture and substance of much of constitutional litigation remains to be
seen.  Perhaps decisions like Dukes v. Wal-Mart can actually rekindle
that dialogue.  Otherwise, constitutional litigation will continue to typ-
ically proceed as a solitary affair, achieving compensation for some
and with rare cases having an outsized impact, but without the legiti-
macy, participation, and representation that aggregation can provide,
nor the systemic effects of broad injunctive remedies.  Aggregate defi-
nition of rights may lead to bigger lawsuits, but bigger may sometimes
be better—particularly when developing constitutional values.
256 See Martin H. Redish & Clifford W. Berlow, The Class Action as Political Theory,
85 WASH. U. L. REV. 753, 756 (2007); see also Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 577 (2008) (“This article presents an argument for collective
justice based on democratic participation values.”).
